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If women outnumber men in graduate schools and are entering professional
and other workplaces in unprecedented numbers, and if Title VII has aimed to
eradicate workplace discrimination for almost fifty years, why are women still so
woefully underrepresented at the highest levels of power, leadership, wealth, and
prestige in the contemporary workplace?
This Article is about abusive speech in the workplace. It explores how the
expression of bias in the workplace has evolved and been shaped by
antidiscrimination legislation and jurisprudence. It identifies a category of biased
speech that eludes prosecution under Title VII. Moreover, this Article seeks to
provide explanations as to why this category of speech goes uncaptured by the
law. It posits that changes in workplace behavior and demographics, as well as
narrow judicial interpretations of the law, are responsible for the law's failure to
recognize and acknowledge the nexus between some abusive workplace speech
and actionable Title VII harassment and "because of' claims. Is it the case that
the strictures of Title VII, the benefits of free speech, and the unobstructed
marketplace of ideas make this the appropriate result? Or is it the case that
Title VII's objectives simply cannot be met by mechanically relegating some
biased speech in certain contexts to the realm of the unlawful, while allowing
other, possibly equally corrosive, speech to taint and poison workplace
operations and experiences?
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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, federal courts have repeatedly opined that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 must be "prevent[ed] ... from expanding into a general
civility code."1 Despite Title VII's broad remedial goal of eradicating
discrimination in the workplace, courts believe that it is important to separate
major harms from trivial ones.2 The precise contours of the statute's coverage
have always eluded and perplexed courts trying to discern whether an employer
took an adverse employment action or whether workplace harassment may be
deemed to be "because of' one's protected-class status. 3 Courts have also
struggled to determine whether verbal comments rise to the level of actionable
discrimination or are just part of the day-to-day give and take among coworkers.
Supervisors with caustic or even abusive styles of dealing with subordinates
I. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); see also Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); Morris v. City of Colorado Springs, 666 F.3d 654,
663-64 (10th Cir. 2012); Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Opers., Inc., 663 F.3d 556, 568 (2d
Cir. 2011); Barber v. Cl Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 798 (8th Cir. 2011);
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 472 (7th Cir. 2011); Wilkie v. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 638 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 2011); Jensen v. Potter, 453 F.3d 444, 449 (3d
Cir. 2006).
2. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); see also Millea v.
Metro-N. R.R., 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011); Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816 (7th
Cir. 2009); Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 726 (8th Cir. 2007); Moore v. City of
Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 2006); Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir.
1999).
3. See Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 701 (2011)
(acknowledging the court's confusion as to whether Title VIl covers unconscious as well as
conscious disparate treatment); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110
MICH. L. REV. 69, 108 (2011) (discussing "the current confusion over whether McDonnell
Douglas survived the 1991 amendments to Title VII"); Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying
Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591, 610-11 (2011) (stating that lower courts remain
confused "about what type and strength of evidence could buttress a Title VII claim");
Lindsey E. Sacher, Note, Through the Looking Glass and Beyond: The Future of Disparate
Impact Doctrine Under Title VII, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 603, 613 (2010) (noting that
"[w]hile the abundance of employment discrimination cases brought pursuant to Title VII
has given courts and scholars ample opportunity to develop some consistency in that area of
law, Title VIIi doctrine remains relatively unexplored, creating substantial confusion .... ").
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raise the same question. Indeed, the harm conferred upon women by "verbal,
behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional,
that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative ... slights and insults,"
4
termed "microaggressions," has been identified for years.
5
Because people's behavior shapes the law, which in turn shapes and guides
people's behavior, 6 antidiscrimination law must keep pace with the evolution of
bias in the workplaceV7-but it has not always done so. Title VII-anchored
harassment law, derived from the statute's prohibition in the 1980s,8 and further
expounded and refined in the 1990s 9 and 2000s,' has made clear that "simple
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of
employment." I I
This Article is about abusive speech in the workplace. It explores how the
expression of bias in the workplace has been shaped by antidiscrimination
legislation and jurisprudence.' 2 It examines the benefits to and drawbacks of
Title VII's creation of a veneer of civility, or at least political correctness, in the
workplace, despite the persistence of discriminatory bias in the thoughts and
underlying actions of crucial decision makers. 13 It identifies a category of biased
speech that eludes prosecution under Title VII because it neither rises to the
requisite level of severity or pervasiveness to be actionable harassment, nor
4. Derald Wing Sue et al., Microaggressions in Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical
Practice, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 271, 271 (2007).
5. See DERALD WING SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION xvi-xvii (2010) (attributing the first use of the term
"microaggressions" to Chester Pierce in his work with black Americans in the 1970s; see
Chester M. Pierce et al., An Experiment in Racism: TV Commercials, in TELEVISION AND
EDUCATION 62 (Chester M. Pierce ed., 1978)); see also Peggy C. Davis, Law as
Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1561 (1989) (discussing racial microaggressions
within the court system); Daniel Sol6rzano et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial
Microaggressions and Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of African American
College Students, 69 J. NEGRO EDUC. 73 (2000).
6. See Darren Rosenblum, Unsex Mothering: Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 57, 105 (2012) (quoting Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing:
Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 763 (2007)); Susan
D. Carle, How Myth-Busting About the Historical Goals of Civil Rights Activism Can
Illuminate Future Paths, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 167, 186 (2011); Deborah L. Brake, When
Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off- The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 579 (2004).
7. See Shawn Clancy, Note, The Queer Truth: The Need to Update Title VII to Include Sexual
Orientation, 37 J. LEGIS. 119, 124 (2011-12) ("Oncale expressly acknowledged that Title
VI's discrimination protections advance beyond Congress's original scope, expanding
employee protections as our understanding of discrimination likewise evolves.").
8. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986).
9. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
82 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
10. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 149-59 (2004).
11. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part Il.B.
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enables a finding that an act occurred "because of' a plaintiffs race, sex, or
other protected-class status. 14 This category of speech, however, exacts a toll on
the individuals' morale, productivity, perceptions of themselves, and perceptions
of others in the workplace, which seems contrary to the intentions of Title VII. 15
Similarly, it might explain (at least in part) the seeming disconnect between the
diverse, integrated classes that graduate from top schools each year and enter the
workforce, and the portrait of those who emerge as captains of industry, political
leaders, and generally senior, powerful members of the workforce.' 
6
Moreover, this Article seeks to explain why this category of speech goes
uncaptured by the law. 17 It posits that narrow judicial interpretations of the law
have resulted in the law's failure to recognize some categories of abusive
workplace speech that should, but do not, create actionable Title VII harassment
and "because of' claims.' 8 The Article concludes that courts could find that these
categories of speech are discriminatory in nature without creating a "civility
code." 19
This Article utilizes examples from cases brought in both so-called white-
collar and blue-collar workplace contexts. There has been widespread debate
about whether and how much to factor in workplace contexts when determining
whether alleged harassment is in fact actionable, particularly with respect to the
requirement that actionable harassment be severe or pervasive and affect a
reasonable person in the victim's shoes.2 ° In any event, this Article will maintain
focus on abusive speech that falls short of the standard for what is actionable in
any given context, irrespective of whether that standard is consistent across
contexts.
Although this Article is about the effect of this abusive speech on gender
equality in the workplace, there are surely implications for its effect on racial
equality in the workplace. In fact, this Article adverts to several racial
harassment cases to make various points. Despite the fact that racial harassment
and sexual harassment have key differences in their expression, perception, and
treatment by courts, which are outside the scope of this Article, the use of these
race cases can be instructive with respect to some of the proffered points.
A workplace culture tainted by bias uncaptured by existing law will
invariably mean a skewed, imbalanced population will rise to the top and arrive
at the helm. This may happen because of overt bias that current jurisprudence is
not capturing. 21 Alternatively, it may happen because of subtle, masked, or even
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.A-C.
16. See infra Part III.A-B.
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.D.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986); Ann C. McGinley,
Harassing "Girls" at the Hard Rock: Masculinities in Sexualized Environments, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1229, 1255-63 (2007).
21. See infra Part IV.A.
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less than conscious bias-both reflected and fuelled by biased speech-that
operates to pollute selection and promotion processes.22 It may also happen
because large numbers of members of certain classes, often women and
minorities, become weary from exposure to speech and attitudes that erode
confidence and dignity at work while eluding ensnarement by the law. 23 They
may also interpret a lack of civility as a signal that a supervisor is a bad actor (or
at least one who has trouble controlling negative feelings and lets them manifest
themselves through behavior) and harbors other antisocial views, such as views
on members of protected classes, which will manifest themselves overtly or
subtly. Many members of these groups thus may shrink back from opportunity
and advancement, and ultimately, weed themselves out of the workplace.24
This Article seeks to identify and open up discussion and debate about this
lawful, yet deleterious, category of speech. To the extent that one has not, under
current interpretations of the law, been harassed or discriminated against because
of a protected-class status, has Title VII done its job if individuals are
nonetheless barraged with decision makers' biased beliefs and subscriptions to
stereotypes? Or can Title VII recognize that the voicing of these beliefs and
stereotypes can be discriminatory, without creating a civility code?
II. BACKGROUND
A. Title VII and Harassment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer
to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.25 Initial claims under the statute, later termed
claims for disparate treatment, alleged simple, facially disparate treatment on the
basis of protected-class status. 26 Later, the Supreme Court acknowledged an
action for disparate impact discrimination in which a plaintiff could allege,
without demonstrating discriminatory intent, that a facially neutral policy or
practice, whose maintenance was a business necessity, conferred a disparate and
ultimately discriminatory impact on a protected class.
27
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized that a cognizable cause of action
could lie in cases of sexual harassment.28 Thus, a plaintiff could demonstrate
unlawful discrimination by showing that her "workplace [wa]s permeated with
22. See infra Part III.C.
23. See infra Part Ill.
24. See infra Part III.D.
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
26. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Fisher v.
Flynn, 598 F.2d 663 (1st Cir. 1979).
27. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
28. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
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discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that [wa]s sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive
working environment., 29 A typical sexual harassment plaintiff must prove the
following elements:
(1) that she (or he) is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected
to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based upon sex;
(4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of plaintiffs employment and create an abusive work environment;
(5) that sexually objectionable conduct was both objectively and subjectively
offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive and
the victim in fact did perceive it to be so; and (6) that some basis for employer
liability has been established. 3
0
B. How Title VII Helped to Make Some Abusive Speech Taboo
Just as behavior shapes the law by precipitating and demonstrating a need
for legislation, so, too, does the law shape behavior. 31 By creating social norms
and awareness and setting the parameters for how rules will operate, law renders
certain behavior socially taboo and incentivizes people to find ways around the
rules. 32 So has been the case with Title VII. As each progressive decade passed,
the notion that explicitly hateful or harassing behavior was forbidden further
crystallized. 33 With each new frontier of class-animus-based or class-
exclusionary behavior came, albeit sometimes slowly, a concomitant
announcement that the law would be interpreted to capture the behavior and
render the perpetrator liable. 34
Prior to the passage of Title VII, racial, gendered, and other epithets and
29. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
30. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-89 (1998); Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-23; Meritor Sav.
Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-73).
31. See supra note 6.
32. See Change Social Norms: Introduction, CTR. FOR APPLIED RES. SOLUTIONS,
http://www.youthbingedrinking.org/strategies/norms.php (last visited July 22, 2012) ("Social
norms are standards of behavior that prevail in our culture. They are shaped either
consciously or unconsciously by our parents' attitudes and beliefs, peer influences, school
rules, law enforcement policies, religious affiliations, cultural traditions, the mass media,
advertising, and marketing practices.").
33. See Kevin Leo Yabut Nadal, Responding to Racial, Gender, and Sexual Orientation
Microaggressions in the Workplace, in PRAEGER HANDBOOK ON UNDERSTANDING AND
PREVENTING WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION 23, 23 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 2011) ("Given
that political correctness has become omnipresent in contemporary times, it is less acceptable
for people to be overtly racist, sexist, or heterosexist. Individuals may still hold prejudices on
the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, and other identities, however, that manifest
unconsciously in their interactions with others."); BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE
EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 96 (2007) ("In the private-
sector workplace, I can say, perhaps no less glibly but also no less appropriately, that you
have no right to free speech except when you do.").
34. See infra Part I1.C., IV.
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stereotypes were often considered socially, culturally, and professionally
acceptable. 35 After its passage, however, society learned that such speech, once
anchored to an adverse employment action, could serve as the "smoking gun"-
evidence from which a trier of fact would conclude that the underlying
motivation for an action was, in fact, unlawful discrimination. 36 Inasmuch as
certain speech about the very presence of women in the workplace, such as
labeling a job as one for a "lady receptionist" or insisting that a subordinate sleep
with her supervisor, was once taken for granted as funny, commonplace, and
acceptable, Title VII has slowly sowed the seeds of awareness that such behavior
is socially unacceptable and unlawful. Examples of this are countless. 
37
Title VII and the judge-made doctrines that aid in its interpretation have
had to evolve to capture and eradicate increasingly more sophisticated
discriminatory speech and behavior. By the early 1970s, the Supreme Court had
announced the disparate impact theory of Title VII liability, recognizing that a
facially neutral policy or practice could still disproportionately impact a
protected class. This sent a clear message to employers that even if they were
able to disguise animus or intentional discrimination with a facially neutral
policy or practice, the law would capture the behavior, and its adverse effect
would be deemed "because of' protected-class status.38 Later, in 1986, the Court
35. See Navah C. Spero, Transgendered Plaintiffs in Title VII Suits: Why the Schroer v.
Billington Approach Makes Sense, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 387, 411 (2010) ("Before the [sic]
Title VII was passed in 1964, it was permissible to discriminate against women and black
people based on stereotypes about their ability or appropriate social roles."); Susan M.
Omilian & Jean P. Kamp, Theory and Concept of Illegal Sex Discrimination, in SEX-BASED
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 1:2 (2012) ("Assumptions about the differences between
men and women, whether or not they were valid, could have been, the Court recognized, the
basis for an employer's practice prior to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and similar laws."); see, e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986).
36. See Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment
Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 603 n.76 (2000) ("The Texaco race discrimination case
illustrates the prevailing concept of discrimination as overt bias. Until The New York Times
broke the story of the secret tape recordings of Texaco executives allegedly referring to black
employees as 'fucking n[*]ggers' and 'black jelly beans,' the class action race discrimination
lawsuit against Texaco received limited media attention... [t]he racial epithets, however,
provided the 'smoking gun' for the race discrimination plaintiffs-'real' evidence of
conscious, overt, and negative bias against black Texaco employees." (citation omitted));
Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 353, 375 n.98 (2008) ("Examples of direct evidence, or 'smoking guns,' include
'epithets or slurs uttered by an authorized agent of the employer, a decisionmaker's
admission that he would or did act against the plaintiff because of his or her protected
characteristic, or, even more clearly, an employer policy framed squarely in terms of race,
sex, religion, or national origin. "'(citation omitted)).
37. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Priest v.
Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 582 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("Ms. Priest established a primafacie case
by showing that Rotary grabbed her, touched intimate parts of her body, tried to kiss her,
rubbed his body on hers, picked her up and carried her across the bar room, [and] made
sexually suggestive comments to and about her ... ").
38. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) ("Under [Title VII], practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.").
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & JUSTICE
held that even if a supervisor does not tangibly harm an employee by dismissing
or otherwise excluding her from the workplace, he can still violate Title VII by
rendering her working environment rife with sex-based abuse and ridicule. 39 The
notion that propositioning or otherwise making a female subordinate feel
uncomfortable at work because of her sex was unacceptable also appeared
throughout popular culture. Workplace trainings, social discourse, and the media
began to reference sexual harassment and to highlight the unacceptability of this
behavior. 40
With the 1990s came clarification that same-sex harassment was
cognizable and that sexual desire did not need to underlie actionable workplace
harassment. During this time, Congress also codified the notion that where a
decision is made for both a lawful, permissible reason and a discriminatory,
unlawful reason, liability will nonetheless inhere. 42 These and other ideas caused
people to think further about what they said and to whom they said it in the
workplace.
With the advent of the 2000s came a new cause of action for family
responsibility discrimination, a form of discrimination perpetrated against
women with young children. 43 This was significant because the cause of action
delineated a specific subset of a protected class as warranting additional
protection.44 It construed comments expressing attitudes of doubt or reservation
about the capabilities of women with young children as evincing unlawful
discrimination "because of sex," even where plaintiffs were passed over in favor
of other women without small children. 45
Further, courts recognized the so-called "cat's paw" theory, under which a
decision-maker who lacked knowledge of a plaintiffs protected-class status
could nevertheless engage in discriminatory decision-making to the extent that
her decision was fuelled, tainted, or otherwise informed by information or
39. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ("Sexual harassment which creates
a hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to
sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality." (quoting Henson
v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,902 (11 th Cir. 1982))).
40. See e.g., Leigh Kimmel, The Boundaries of Sexual Harassment: Their Development from the
Sixties to the Nineties, LEIGHKIMMEL.COM,
http://www.leighkimmel.com/writing/academicpapers/sexualharassment.shtml (last updated
Apr. 11, 2013).
41. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) ("The prohibition of
harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it
forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the "conditions" of the victim's
employment.").
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.").




reports that contained others' biases against protected-class members. 46 Thus, the
speech and attitudes of not only decision-makers, but of evaluators, coworkers,
and others who "reported on" an employee became relevant. 47 Moreover,
although sexual orientation and gender identity are still not protected classes
under federal law, the swell of legislation passed at the state and local levels that
protects gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals from workplace
discrimination indicates a sharper societal and professional awareness of
discrimination against these classes. 48 This awareness has, to some extent,
permeated corporate and workplace culture. It has thus influenced public
discourse-the ever-increasing realm of that which is socially taboo to say at
work-and workplace employee trainings, among other things.
Despite all of the progress that employment discrimination law has made, it
continues to cling irrationally to the precept that Title VII is not a civility code,
leaving it tolerant of some of the most nefarious workplace speech and
•. 49
conditions. In the name of not prohibiting general or "neutral" workplace
vulgarity and subtly expressed generalized attitudes, the law has turned its back
on employees who are alienated, humiliated, and inhibited at work "because of"
their protected-class status. Although U.S. courts are cautious not to create a
civility code or provide a remedy for discrimination that is merely "in the air,"
other countries have recognized a right to maintain human dignity in the
workplace and are thus taking steps to eliminate workplace bullying. In the
United States, these types of measures are becoming more recognized in the area
of education and interactions among children. Is the workplace shielded from
this type of progress because of a few stray and amorphous comments in
Supreme Court decisions of the past?
C. "Discrimination in the Air"
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court found that Ann Hopkins was
unlawfully denied partnership at Price Waterhouse because of her gender. 50 The
46. See, e.g., EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 450 F.3d 476, 484 (10th Cir. 2006)
(acknowledging other courts' recognition of the cat's paw theory, which, "[i]n the
employment discrimination context.., refers to a situation in which a biased subordinate,
who lacks decisionmaking power, uses the formal decisionmaker as a dupe in a deliberate
scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action"); Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab,
Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11 th Cir. 1998).
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 963 (1992) ("An employee organization entering into an
agreement shall not: (1) Discriminate against a person seeking or holding membership
therein on account of race, color, creed, religion, age, disability, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or national origin."); see also Sexual Orientation Discrimination: Your
Rights, NOLO LAW FOR ALL, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/sexual -orientation-
discrimination-rights-29541.html (last visited July 22, 2012); Sexual Orientation
Discrimination in the Workplace, FINDLAW, http://employment.findlaw.conlemployment-
discrimination/sexual-orientation-discrimination-in-the-workplace.html (last visited July 22,
2012).
49. See infra Part IV.
50. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF GENDER, LAW & JUSTICE
evidence there, the Court said, clearly demonstrated that the partners' perception
of Hopkins was colored by the fact that she was a woman, thus making her a
victim of gender stereotyping.51
One partner described her as "macho"; another suggested that she
"overcompensated for being a woman"; a third advised her to take "a course at
charm school." Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response,
one partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only
"because it's a lady using foul language." Another supporter explained that
Hopkins "ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed
mgr [sic] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr
[sic] candidate." But it was the man who ... bore responsibility for explaining
to Hopkins the reasons for the Policy Board's decision to place her candidacy
on hold who delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for
partnership, [he] advised, Hopkins should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry."' 52
Price Waterhouse argued that "Title VII does not prohibit discrimination
'in the air' 53 [and is] violated only if the discrimination was a 'but for' cause of
an adverse employment decision." 54 The Court flatly rejected the notion that this
was a case in which discrimination was merely "in the air," agreeing with
Hopkins that discrimination was actually "brought to ground and visited upon an
employee. 55 Although Congress later amended Title VII to permit employer
liability in cases where discrimination was "a motivating factor for any
employment practice," 56 the precept that "discrimination in the air" is not
actionable has persisted.57
The notion of what "discrimination in the air" means has not been uniform
or consistent. 58 In 1988, Ann Hopkins conceded in her brief that Title VII's
51. Id. at 235.
52. Id. (internal citations omitted).
53. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (No. 87-
1167).
54. Id. at 21-22.
55. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) ("[Ain unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.").
57. See, e.g., Randle v. LaSalle Telecomms., Inc., 697 F. Supp. 1474, 1479 (N.D. Ill. 1988) aff'd,
876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1989) ("As with negligence, discrimination 'in the air, so to speak,
will not do."'); Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal. 4th 203, 231 (2013) ("Were it
otherwise, the causation requirement in section 12940(a) would be eviscerated... [it] does
not prohibit discrimination 'in the air."'); Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20 F. Supp. 2d
1193, 1199-1201 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
58. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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prohibitions are directed at conduct or employment practices, not thoughts. 59 She
noted that the district court below had "expressly rejected judicial involvement
in insignificant matters and said that courts were not responsible for 'polic[ing]
every instance where subjective judgment may be tainted by unarticulated,
unconscious assumptions related to sex."' 60 Nonetheless, Hopkins prevailed in
her case. But, the precise reasons for her victory went unarticulated.
Since then, courts have considered the term "discrimination in the air" to
mean many different things. One court used it to mean discrimination that is not
voiced explicitly, but rather inferred from looking at who has gained access to a
workplace. Another court used the term to refer to discrimination that did not
actually cause harm to any individuals. 62 Yet another court used the term to
mean discrimination that is not expressed by a person with decision-making
authority in a context that would implicate him or her in unlawful discriminatory
behavior. 63 Finally, the term has also been used to describe weak, "tepid"
evidence of discrimination.
64
The fact of the matter is that the comments made about Ann Hopkins
represented discrimination that truly was "in the air." These comments revealed
that those around her held and expressed views and expectations of women that
59. Brief for Respondent at 29, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-
1167).
60. Id. at 30.
61. See Kemplin v. Gould, Inc., No. 88 C 6522, 1989 WL 135061, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 31,
1989).
Kemplin's second "piece" of evidence is that Gould's history of discrimination is
"evident from looking around the work place," and that "no one coming into the
company could be described as aged or overweight." We find that these self-serving
statements are simply not probative evidence that Williams' stated reasons for
choosing Freed over Kemplin was pretextual. We will not deny summary judgment
on the grounds that Kemplin alleges there is "discrimination in the air."
Id. (citation omitted).
62. See Gavalik v. Cont'l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 862 (3d Cir. 1987).
Continental maintains that it "met its burden of proving that no one in Pittsburgh
was affected by any alleged discriminatory policy. . . [and t]hus, any presumption
as to each Plaintiff and each class member disappeared and there was no basis for
any remedy for anyone." Continental moves too far too fast. While the
"discrimination in the air" concept is relevant to an individual's entitlement to
relief, it does not affect the presumption that arises upon proof of a discriminatory
policy.
Id. (citation omitted).
63. See Chuang v. T.W. Wang Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
The time, place and circumstances under which these remarks were made are not
stated, nor are they alleged to have been made by persons who had the authority to
terminate his employment.... Such comments, which may conceivably be
construed as age-biased generally, do not bolster, much less support, Plaintiff
Chuang's claim. Discrimination in the air, so to speak, will not do.
Id.
64. Rowlin v. Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, No. Civ. A. 00-D-580-N, 2001 WL 630581, at *4
(M.D. Ala. May 22, 2001) (noting that, "proffers of tepid, ubiquitous evidence cannot
support any claim. An employee's subjective belief of 'discrimination in the air' is not
enough; the allegations must be brought home with concrete proof."), vacated, No. Civ. A.
00-H-580-N, 2001 WL 965068 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 2001).
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would systematically disadvantage Hopkins as she interacted with, worked for,
65
and was evaluated by them. Ann Hopkins, however, was fortunate because she
could show a direct nexus between this expressed discrimination and the adverse
employment decision that befell her. 66 However, as the Court observed,
"[r]emarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that
gender played a part in a particular employment decision." 67 Rather, "[t]he
plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its
decision. ' 68 But, the Court announced, "[i]n making this showing, stereotyped
remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part." 69 Notwithstanding,
the Court found that
Hopkins proved that Price Waterhouse invited partners to submit comments;
that some of the comments stemmed from sex stereotypes; that an important
part of the Policy Board's decision on Hopkins was an assessment of the
submitted comments; and that Price Waterhouse in no way disclaimed reliance
on the sex-linked evaluations.
70
Thus, the comments were inextricably linked to the adverse action.
71
Context, however, is crucial. In Hopkins's case, the comments were
somewhat of a "smoking gun," made at the time of the actual decision-making
juncture of the partnership. 72 All too often, however, because of specific
details-who made the comments, when the comments were made, who the
comments were made about, and in what context--discriminatory beliefs voiced
in the workplace are viewed as too attenuated from the adverse action at issue to
qualify as evidence sufficient to put before a trier of fact or sustain a victory for
the plaintiff.73 Moreover, this dilution of the speech's potency as evidence of
65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
66. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.




71. Id. ('This is not, as Price Waterhouse suggests, 'discrimination in the air;' rather, it is, as
Hopkins puts it, 'discrimination brought to ground and visited upon' an employee.") Id.
72. See id. at 256.
73. See generally Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains
Discrimination in the Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REv. 1117, 1120 (2008)
("Efforts to explore the circumstantial terrain for meaningful markers of discriminatory
conduct have.., diminished the statute's effectiveness as a shield for workers from the
venom of discrimination. Hence, the courts have created various loopholes that allow
organizations to... escape liability for workplace discrimination."); Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in
Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 205-06 (describing the increased
inappropriate use of summary judgment and the erosion of the fact finder's role in federal
employment discrimination cases, such that the efficacy of antidiscrimination laws are
substantially undermined); Sandra F. Sperino, A Modern Theory of Direct Corporate
Liability for Title VII, 61 ALA. L. REV. 773, 791-92 (2010) (discussing the stray remarks
doctrine and its deleterious effect on employment discrimination cases); Kerri Lynn Stone,
Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. Louis U. L.J. 111, 123-41 (2011)
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discrimination is furthered when the adverse action occurs (1) in a context in
which other, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action are
evident, 74 and (2) under circumstances in which the workplace population,
comprised of people both affected and not affected by the action, is so diverse
that it is not clear whether an individual has been treated in a given way "because
of' his or her protected-class status. 75 In this way, speech that is toxic to
individuals and to workplaces eludes capture by the law-even after an adverse
employment action befalls someone who is the target of such speech.
This speech may very well be the only adducible evidence of the
discriminatory beliefs of those who populate and govern the workplace.
Moreover, discriminatory sentiments in the workplace are sometimes
unaccompanied by an adverse employment action. In such a case, the only Title
VII theory that a plaintiff distressed by such speech could sue under is that of
harassment. 76 To the extent that the speech does not meet the rigorous
requirements that harassment jurisprudence has set forth,77 especially the
requirement that it be deemed "severe or pervasive,"' 78 it will not be rendered
actionable. 79 In this way, true discrimination "in the air" may have a palpably
deleterious effect upon workplace interpersonal relations, communication, and
culture/ethos, but still go unregulated by Title VII. 80
Il. WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
A. The Gap
It is important to realize that we are in a very critical moment in the history
of the civil rights movement. On one hand, it is significant that in certain
[hereinafter Stone, Shortcuts] (documenting several shortcuts used by Judges, often at the
summary judgment stage, to dismiss employment discrimination cases, including, the same
actor inference, the stray comment doctrine, and various temporal nexus requirements); Kerri
Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment
Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. REV. 149, 174-82 (2012) [hereinafter Stone, Taking in
Strays] (examining the stray remarks doctrine, and stating, "[tihis mal-formed, misplaced
doctrine has caused systemic harm to employment discrimination plaintiffs."); Michael J.
Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577,585
(2001) (describing how the court's "slicing and dicing" of the probative value of plaintiff's
evidence of discrimination has made it very difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in bringing
disparate treatment claims under the McDonnell Douglas approach).
74. See, e.g., Villalpando v. Salazar, 420 F. App'x 848, 852-54 (10th Cir. 2011); McFadden v.
Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hairston v. AK
Steel Corp., 162 F. App'x 505, 510 (6th Cir. 2006); Spearmon v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 662 F.2d
509, 512 (8th Cir. 1981).
75. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 193 F. App'x 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2006); Bacon v. Honda
of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2004).
76. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 28-29 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Brief for Petitioner, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, supra note 53.
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respects, members of protected classes have been afforded access to education
and opportunity at historically unprecedented levels. 81 In fact, the gap between
the ratio of females to males enrolled in college has only grown since 1991, with
women now comprising the majority (56 percent) of college students (estimated
to number about 11.3 million female students). 82 In 2011, 64.6 percent of male
recent high school graduates were enrolled in college, whereas 72.3 percent of
similarly-aged women were enrolled. 83 According to the National Center for
Education Statistics, the number of women in post-baccalaureate programs has
exceeded the number of men since 1988, and between the years 2000 and 2010,
the number of women in these programs increased by 62 percent, while the
number of men increased by only 38 percent. 84 Even among part-time post-
baccalaureate students, the number of women increased by 26 percent, compared
to a mere 17 percent increase among men.85
Some schools have taken action to maintain a more gender-balanced
student body. In 2010, it was reported that college leaders admitted that their
schools were giving an admissions "boost" to male applications in order to better
81. Fast Facts, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION SCIENCES,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id-98 (last visited June 3, 2013) ("The percentage of
American college students who are Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Black has been
increasing. From 1976 to 2010, the percentage of Hispanic students rose from 3 percent to 13
percent, the percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander students rose from 2 percent to 6 percent,
and the percentage of Black students rose from 9 percent to 14 percent. During the same
period, the percentage of White students fell from 83 percent to 61 percent."); Richard Perez-
Pena, U.S. Bachelor Degree Rate Passes Milestone, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.con/2012/02/24/education/census-finds-bachelors-degrees-at-record-
level.html ("For many years, colleges have enrolled and graduated more women than men,
and a historic male advantage in higher education has nearly been erased. In 2001, men held
a 3.9 percentage-point lead in bachelor's degrees and 2.6 percentage points in graduate
degrees; by last year, both gaps were down to 0.7 percent."); U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, College
Enrollment and Work Activity of 2011 High School Graduates, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (Apr. 19, 2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/hsgec.nrO.htm/ ("The college enrollment rate of Asian
graduates (82.2 percent) was higher than for recent white (66.6 percent), black (58.2
percent), and Hispanic (70.3 percent) graduates").
82. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CPS OCTOBER 2010 - DETAILED TABLES, TYPE OF COLLEGE AND
YEAR ENROLLED FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY AGE, SEX, RACE,
ATTENDANCE STATUS, CONTROL OF SCHOOL, AND ENROLLMENT STATUS: OCTOBER 2010,
tab.5 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/school/data/cps/2010/tables.html;
Mark Mather & Dia Adams, The Crossover in Female-Male College Enrollment Rates,
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Feb. 2007)
http://www.prb.org/articles/2007/crossoverinfemalemalecollegeenrollmentrates.aspx (last
visited July 22, 2012) ("Since 1991, the proportion of young women enrolled in college has
exceeded the enrollment rate for young men, and the gap has widened over time. In 2005,
about 43 percent of women ages 18 to 24 were enrolled in college, compared with 35 percent
of young men.").
83. College Enrollment and Work Activity of 2011 High School Graduates, supra note 81 ("For
2011 graduates, the college enrollment rate was 72.3 percent for young women and 64.6
percent for young men.").
84. Fast Facts, supra note 81.
85. Id.
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balance gender ratios in admitted classes. 86 These leaders defended their actions
by noting that male and female students alike prefer balanced gender ratios. 87 It
was even reported that if Vassar College were to accept equal percentages of
each sex that applied, female students would outnumber male students by more
than two to one. 88 According to U.S. News and World Report, numerous schools
have applied preferences, admitting male and female students at sometimes very
different rates in an attempt to strike a better balance. 89 Bemoaning trends like
these, one New York Times opinion piece asked "[w]hat messages are we
sending young women that they must.., be even more accomplished than men
to gain admission to the nation's top colleges?" 90 This is quite a change from
1970, when 58 percent of college students were male. 91 Further, projections
indicate that the disparity between qualified male and female applicants to higher
education will only increase with time.
92
Women have also made tremendous strides and gains in fields that have
been historically dominated by men. For example, the percentage of women
enrolled in law school increased from 7 percent between 1969 and 1970 to 47
percent between 2011 and 2012.93 Overall, as of 2010, 8.8 million women
earned their master's degrees, compared to 7.2 million men.94 In medical
86. Colleges' Gender Gap: Women Now Outnumber Men in Both Applying to Schools and




89. Alex Kingsbury, Many Colleges Reject Women at Higher Rates Than for Men, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, June 17, 2007), available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/articles/070617/25gender.htm (detailing that "[u]sing
undergraduate admissions rate data collected from more than 1,400 four-year colleges and
universities that participate in the magazine's rankings, U.S. News has found that over the
past 10 years many schools are maintaining their gender balance by admitting men and
women at sometimes drastically different rates." The article also noted that schools like
Pomona, Boston College, Wesleyan University, Tufts, and the College of William and Mary
tend to tip the scale in favor of boys when it comes to maintaining a balanced student body.
The reason for this is because "[f]rom the early grades on up, girls tend to be better students.
By the time college admissions come into the picture, many watchers of the 'boy gap' agree,
it's too late for the lads to catch up on their own.").
90. Colleges' Gender Gap, supra note 86 (citing Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed., To All the
Girls I've Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2006)
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/opinion/23britz.html?_r=I).
91. CATHERINE E. FREEMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATS, TRENDS IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
OF GIRLS AND WOMEN: 2004, 70 (Nov. 2004), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2005/2005016.pdf.
92. THOMAS D. SNYDER & SALLY A. DILLOW, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 2010, 409 (2011), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs20l1/2011015.pdf (projecting that by 2016-2017, women will earn
64.7 percent of associate's degrees, 57.5 percent of bachelor's degrees, 60.4 percent of
Master's degrees, and 54.8 percent of doctorate degrees).
93. AM. BAR ASS'N, Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2011 (2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal-education-and-admission
s to the bar/statistics/enrollment -.degrees.awarded.authcheckdam.pdf.
94. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 -
DETAILED TABLES, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF THE POPULATION 25 YEARS AND
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schools, 48 percent of the graduating class of 2012 was women. 95 Master's
degrees earned by women in business management increased from 34.5 percent
in 2002-2003 to 36.8 percent in 2010-2011.96 The percentage of women earning
their Doctorate degrees in engineering jumped from 0.3 percent in 1966 to 20.2
percent in 2006.9' In 2010-2011, 56.7 percent of women, compared to 43.3
percent of men, earned their Master's degree in the field of professional
sciences.
98
Moreover, protected class members have been afforded entry into
professional and other workplaces at similarly unprecedented levels. 99 But, while
the chasm between the employment rates of young male and female workers has
indeed become smaller since the 1970s-largely due to the fact that fewer males
than females attend college and female employment has increased generally-
men have continued to hold a larger percentage of the workforce than females
across all levels of education. ' 00
OVER, BY SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS: 2011, tbl.2 "Female" & "Male" (2011), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/201 1/tables.html.
95. Ass'N OF AM. MED. COLLEGES, Table 27: Total Graduates by U.S. Medical School and Sex,
2008-2012, available at https://www.aamc.org/download/321532/data/2012factstable27-
2.pdf.
96. Women's Share of MBAs Earned in the U.S., CATALYST (2011), available at
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/womens-share-mbas-earned-us.
97. CATHERINE HILL ET AL., AAUW, WHY SO FEW? WOMEN IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
ENGINEERING, AND MATHEMATICs, 12 (2010), available at
http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Why-So-Few-Women-in-Science-Technology-
Engineering-and-Mathematics.pdf.
98. NATHAN E. BELL & JEFFREY R. ALLUM, COUNCIL OF GRADUATE SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT




99. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Highlight of Women's Earnings in 2010 (2011), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom20l0.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHT OF WOMEN'S
EARNINGS IN 2011 (2012), available at http://www.bis.gov/cps/cpswom2011.pdf; A Current
Glance at Women in the Law, AM. BAR ASS'N (Feb. 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current--glance - statistics-fe
b2013.authcheckdam.pdf; Statistical Overview of Women in the Workplace, CATALYST,
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/statistical-overview-women-workplace (Mar. 13, 2013);
New Statistics for Women-Owned Businesses, MBE CONNECT,
http://mbeconnect.com/2012/03/new-statistics-for-women-owned-businesses-2/ (Mar. 26,
2013); Women in Elective Office 2013, CTR. FOR WOMEN & POLITICS,
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fast-facts/levels of office/documents/elective.pdf; Louise
Single, Gender, Family and Work-Life Issues in Public Accounting, AM. INST. OF CPAS,
(June 16, 2011),
http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCERCONTENT/Newsletters/Articles_201
I/Career/IssuesPublicAccounting.jsp (noting 55 percent of entry-level accounting
professionals are women); Larissa Faw, Why Millennial Women are Burning Out at Work by
30, FORBES ONLINE, (Nov. 11, 2011)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larissafaw/201 1/11 /11/why-millennial-women-are-burning-out-
at-work-by-30/ (reporting that 53 percent of corporate entry-level jobs are held by women).
100. See Employed Persons by Occupation, Sex, and Age 2011, 2012 EMPLOYMENT & EARNINGS
ONLINE, available at http://bls.gov/opub/ee/2012/cps/annavg9_201l .pdf (finding women 16
years and over comprise 46.9 percent of the labor force, whereas men 16 years old and over
continue to occupy 53.1 percent); Educational Attainment by Sex, 1910-2010, INFOPLEASE,
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The disparities do not end there. Focusing specifically on the professional
workplace, it is notable that even today, in the midst of this shift towards
equality of opportunity, as one approaches the apex of power-the highest level
concentrations of power, compensation, recognition, and longevity in the
professional workplace-the disparity between those who have traditionally
occupied the highest levels, men, and those who have not, women, remains as
glaring as ever. 101 In fact, compensation for women has not kept pace with the
strides women have made in training and education.10 2 In 2011, men's median
weekly earnings for full-time work totaled $824 nationally, whereas women's
totaled $669 nationally.' 03 Across education levels, women continue to earn less
than their male counterparts.'
1 04
According to a 2006 New York Times article, despite the fact that law
schools' graduating classes are typically roughly half male and half female, and
despite the fact that law firm hiring tends to be similarly split, "something
unusual happens to most women after they begin to climb into the upper tiers of
law firms. They disappear."10 5 In 2005, a mere 17 percent of law firm partners at
major firms nationwide were women, representing only a slight increase since
1995.106 Likewise, according to McKinsey research, 53 percent of entry-level
corporate jobs belong to women, while only 37 percent of middle management
positions and a mere 26 percent of vice president and senior manager positions
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0779809.html (last visited June 2, 2013) (noting that in
2010, 35.7 percent of women compared to 27.8 percent of men obtained more than four
years of college); see also The Editor's Desk: Educational Attainment of Women in the
Labor Force, 1970-2010, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS.
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/201 1/ted_20111229.htm (Dec. 29, 2011).
101. Allison Linn, Young Women Want it all, Perhaps More Than Young men, MSNBC ONLINE,
http://lifeinc.today.msnbc.msn.com/ news/2012/04/19/11271523-young-women-want-it-all-
perhaps-more-than-young-men?lite; see also U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Highlight of Women's
Earnings in 2010 (Jul. 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2010.pdf
102. See Jessica Arons, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUNDS, Lifetime Losses: The Career
Wage Gap (Dec. 2008), available at
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2008/pdf/equal-pay.pdf.
103. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Highlight of Women's Earnings in 2010 (Jul. 2011), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom20l0.pdf ("In 2010, women who were full-time wage and
salary workers had median weekly earnings of $669. Women earned 81 percent of the
median weekly earnings of their male counterparts ($824)."); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
Highlight of Women's Earnings in 2011 (Oct. 2012), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom20l1.pdf ("In 2011, women who were full-time wage and
salary workers had median usual weekly earnings of $684, about 82 percent of median
earnings for male full-time wage and salary workers ($832).").
104. Women's Earnings and Income, CATALYST (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/womens-earnings-and-income (showing earnings by
degree and sex); Amanda Hess, Women Make Less than Men at Every Education Level,
GOOD NEWS ONLINE, http://www.good.is/post/women-make-less-than-men-at-every-
education-level/ (reporting that in 2009, women at the advanced degree level earned 75
percent of what their male counterparts earned).
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belong to women. 107 The research further indicates that men are twice as likely
to advance at every level in the corporate world. 108
If civil rights laws, and Title VII in particular, are to advance the goals of
true equality of opportunity and access to professional advancement and
wellbeing in the workplace, 109 then a far more searching look into the workplace
achievement gap is needed. What forces are working to winnow out women
from the workplace, thereby keeping them from the highest levels of
achievement? What are women encountering between the point at which they
enter the workplace and the point at which the pyramid narrows at the highest
levels of workplace power, influence, and compensation, where women are
conspicuously absent?
On one hand, many have posited that women self-select out of the
workplace because they want to be home to have and care for families. 110 In the
alternative, it has been argued that women would like to remain in the workplace
but feel forced out by the lack of accommodation for and understanding of
working mothers."' To be sure, work/life/family balance issues have long
107. Faw, supra note 99; see also Statistical Overview of Women in the Workplace, supra note 99.
108. Faw, supra note 99.
109. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); see also Millea v.
Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2011); Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816
(7th Cir. 2009); Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 726 (8th Cir. 2007); Moore v. City of
Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 346 (3d Cir. 2006); Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir.
1999).
110. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, The "Opt Out Revolution" and the Changing Narratives of
Motherhood: Self Governing the Work/Family Conflict, II J. L. & FAM. STUD. 407, 426
(2009) ("Instead of denying the descriptive, analytic, or normative reality of choice, an
effective feminist response may be to shift its analysis to the terrain of self governance and
governmentality, and begin to consider the multiple ways in which motherhood is being
reconfigured on this terrain."); Heather Antecol, THE OPT-OUT REVOLUTION: RECENT
TRENDS IN FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY (2010), available at
http://www.cmc.edu/berger/pdf/oopaperl5v2.pdf (finding evidence of the opt-out
revolution among white, college educated, married women in male-dominated occupations).
111. PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT?: WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS AND HEAD HOME
(2008) ("The majority of women I've spoken to who have decided to stay home to raise
children certainly frame their decision in terms of choices. But when they told me their
stories, the truth was very, very different. They describe the decision as a choice. But in the
end it was a highly conflicted choice and truly a last resort."); E.J. Graff, The Opt-Out Myth,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2007, available at
http://www.cjr.org/essay/theoptoutmyth.php; Joan C. Williams, Jessica Manvell &
Stephanie Bornstein, Opt Out or Pushed Out?: How the Press Covers Work/Family Conflict,
THE CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, U.C. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW (2006), available at
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf (arguing that women are leaving the
paid workforce "because they are being pushed out by (1) an outdated, unrealistic workplace
structure designed around the 1950s concept of the Ideal Worker, (2) workplace bias and
discrimination against mothers, and (3) the failure of U.S. public policy to help workers
balance work and family responsibilities"); Dina Bakst, Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/pregnant-and-
pushed-out-of-a-job.html ("As a result, thousands of pregnant women are pushed out of jobs
that they are perfectly capable of performing-either put on unpaid leave or simply fired-
when they request an accommodation to help maintain a health pregnancy."); Meghan
Casserly, Why is 'Opting Out' A Bad Word for Women?, FORBES ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/201 2/02/28/why-is-opting-out-a-bad-word-for-
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plagued women and hampered their attempts to ascend to the highest levels of
power and compensation in employment, both at the individual and the
collective level. 112 This is undeniable. As the New York Times has reported,
while it is the case that some women do leave their firm jobs to raise their
children fulltime, the results of recent studies indicate that women lawyers "often
feel pushed into that choice and would prefer to maintain their careers and a
family if a structure existed that allowed them to do so." Moreover, "[s]ome
analysts and many women who practice law say that having children isn't the
primary reason that most women leave law firms."' 13 It is thus important that
queries about the achievement gap in the workplace do not end at the issue of
work and family balance. What about women without children? What about
women with children who continue to work, but seek less time-consuming or
prestigious jobs?
Flexibility and the accommodation of family responsibilities in the
workplace, which are suggested by many scholars and direly needed, 1 14 should
not be seen as a panacea that will necessarily close the gap. Workplace cultures
that alienate women must be identified and transformed through legal and non-
legal means. Addressing abusive, gendered workplace speech and its effects is
the first step in this direction.
B. A Tale of Two Eras-The Case of a Contemporary Female Associate
Discrimination is, ironically, harder to discern in an era in which
historically underrepresented groups are increasingly afforded opportunities and
placements they have been historically denied. 115 Take, for example, the case of
a thirty-four-year-old female associate, who filed a complaint in the Southern
District of New York in January 2011, alleging unlawful termination because of
her sex.116
In 2003, she joined the Toronto office of a multinational law firm, and in
women/ ("[T]he truth ... is that no matter the strides made in women's equality in the
workplace, the corporate culture still remains a culture that's not conducive to parenthood.").
112. Williams, et al., supra note 111 (discussing how many "fast-track women" take time off
from work, and the "mommy track," wherein women undertake a "full-time job that reduced
their hours, or put up with deskilling in order to access a family-ftiendly job (by declining a
promotion or taking a job with fewer responsibilities and lower compensation that they were
qualified for)").
113. O'Brien, supra note 105.
114. See supra note 111; Joan Williams, One Sick Child Away From Being Fired: When "Opting
Out" is not an Option, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, U.C. HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW
(2006), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/onesickchild.pdf, Michael Selmi and
Naomi Cahn, Women in the Workplace: Which Women, Which Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GEN. L.
& POL'Y 7, 31-53 (2006).
115. Id.
116. Compl. at 8, Laskis v. Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, No. I I-CIV-0585 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28,
2011), available at
http://media.thestar.topscms.com/acrobat/00/ee/d64998d742668208629ff2c7 I Obf.pdf.
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2004, transferred to its New York branch. 117 According to her complaint, she
generated "high-caliber work" throughout her tenure with the firm. 118 She
alleged that "[t]ypical review comments were that she had 'very good long-term
prospects,' was 'very dependable and resourceful' and provided 'great client
service." 19 This allegedly changed, however, after the appointment of a senior
partner as the Legal Professional Committee ("LPC") New York representative.
As the complaint recited, through his words and actions, "[the senior partner]
encouraged an environment that was hostile and demeaning towards women."
120
Examples cited include: facetiously referring to a female member of the board of
directors of one of the firm's clients, who was rumored to have had a
relationship with the CEO of the company, as being in charge of "oral
communications" 121; a discussion with a male law student who planned to leave
the firm to pursue a master's degree at Harvard Law School, where he stated,
"that's great you are going to Harvard-you might meet some pretty women
pretending to get a legal education"122; and a comment made in response to a
former associate's request for maternity leave asking if she was aware that such a
decision would take her off partnership track. He later explained that he hated
working with women because "they just get pregnant and leave. Out of every
three years you only get one good year out of them." 123
Moreover, the complaint described the associate's annual review with the
senior partner and another partner as follows:
Despite the fact that her performance had remained consistently good, [he] told
her that they "didn't think she wanted to be partner" and that she "must be
more than a pretty face." He told [her] to "show ME you want this" and that
she's "not helping herself coming to work looking well put together." 
124
The complaint alleged that, consequently, the associate was told by the partner
that her salary would be frozen and not increased in comportment with the firm's
lockstep program. 125 When she asked the partners for specific things she could
do to improve, she alleged he told her to "stop acting like a child that's been
taken to the woodshed and spanked;" she had to figure this out on her own; and
that "everyone can improve."' 26 Further, it is alleged that he provided no criteria
by which she could measure her performance or areas she could work on to







124. Id. at 3-4.




After the associate complained about her frozen salary and the comments
that had been made to her and encouraged a partner investigating the incident to
talk with other women at the firm, the complaint alleged that the senior partner
was sent to sensitivity training and removed from his position as
representative. 128 The associate alleged that she was then retaliated against when
she received new negative evaluative comments at a subsequent review from the
board of partners. The board included the senior partner as well as partners with
whom the associate had hardly worked. Moreover, in some instances, the
evaluative comments were related to work for which she was not even
responsible. 129 Despite her protests, her salary remained frozen and she was told
that if she failed to improve, the firm would likely "not want her there at the end
of the year." 1
30
Despite what the complaint characterizes as a series of career successes
over the next six months, the associate's salary was raised only minimally and
kept below her class level; she was also denied any bonus. 131 In June 2009, she
was terminated. Although the case appears to have settled, it proves
instructive as to the current state of the law.
The problems with the associate's case are both multifold and illustrative.
Based upon the facts alleged in her complaint, it is hard to conceive of a way in
which she can substantiate a cognizable claim under Title VII. In the first place,
while the partner's comments and the apparent atmosphere in which the
associate worked may indicate that her failure to retain her employment was
somehow "because of' her sex, the context in which her case took place seems to
belie a case of sex discrimination.
Unlike Price Waterhouse, where Ann Hopkins was the only woman being
considered for partnership that year, 133 the associate was far from the only
female in her firm. The firm, unlike Price Waterhouse in the 1980s, had a
somewhat respectable number of female partners. 34 It is also likely that just as
many men as women were fired during the layoffs the firm claimed were
economy-based. 135 Indeed, in an age in which civil rights laws have worked well
127. Id.
128. Id. at 5.
129. Id. at 6.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 7.
133. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989) ("Of the 662 partners at the firm
at that time, 7 were women. Of the 88 persons proposed for partnership that year, only 1-
Hopkins-was a woman. Forty-seven of these candidates were admitted to the partnership, 21
were rejected, and 20-including Hopkins-were 'held' for reconsideration the following
year.").
134. See OSLER, Our People, http://www.osler.com/OurPeople/ (last visited July 22, 2012).
135. See Elie Mystal, Aggrieved Women Potpourri: Sexual Harassment Canada-Style, and the
Return of Charlene Morisseau, ABOVE THE LAW,
http://abovethelaw.com/2011/02/aggrieved-women-potpourri-sexual-harassment-canada-
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enough to ensure there are at least some female partners and decision makers, 
136
it is ironic that it may be harder now to discern cases in which sex discrimination
took place. In Price Waterhouse, the plaintiffs status as the only potentially
viable female partnership candidate, coupled with the dearth of women promoted
to the highest positions, 137 indicated exclusion and possibly even discrimination.
This conclusion was relatively easy to reach; it appeared, even before any
"smoking gun" evidence was considered.
In the more modem scenario, however, women's increased presence at all
levels of employment seems to militate against any premise that actionable sex
discrimination occurred. Furthermore, once modem adjudicatory doctrines, such
as the so-called stray comment doctrine, which focuses on comments not
directed to the plaintiff 38 or those made too far apart in time from the moment
the employment decision was made, 139 are applied to discount evidence, it seems
highly unlikely that there will be enough remaining evidence at the summary
judgment stage to permit a contemporary case to survive.
The associate's complaint tells a compelling, albeit common narrative: she
worked under at least one man who seemed to harbor negative, stereotyped ideas
style-and-the-return-of-charlene-morisseau/#more-58526 (last visited July 22, 2012) ("[l]t
seems to me that to prevail on a sexual harassment claim arising out of a legal layoff in 2009,
you're going to need a little more than a few wisecracks about working women.").
136. See infra Part III.B.
137. See supra note 133.
138. See, e.g., Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2006). In Twymon, the court
held that the comments were stray because while the speakers
were involved in the decision to terminate [the plaintiff], none of the statements...
were related to the decisional process itself. Hall's alleged "Uncle Tom" statements,
while racially offensive and misguided, were apparently made in the context of
attempting to preserve and promote [the plaintiffs] career at Wells Fargo, not in
relation to deciding to terminate [her]. Similarly, none of the statements ... were
made during the decisional process accompanying Wells Fargo's termination of
[the plaintiff].
Id. at 934; see also Stone, Taking in Strays, supra note 73, at 167 ("Numerous cases have
discounted or dismissed as worthless comments that might otherwise be probative simply
because they were not directed toward the plaintiff, they were not said in the context of the
adverse action at issue, or both.").
139. See, e.g., Stone v. Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 329 F. App'x 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding
that the "evidence presented does not show either sufficient temporal proximity or any
relationship between the remarks and the challenged conduct[,]" and thus, "these remarks do
not mandate reversal of the district court's [grant of summary] judgment"); Phelps v. Yale
Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1026 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the comments "made... nearly
a year" before a termination "were made too long before the layoff to have influenced the
termination decision"); Home Repair, Inc. v. Paul W. Davis Sys., Inc., No. 98-C-4074, 2000
WL 126905, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2000) ("Such a long time period between racially-
offensive actions and the adverse action serves to defeat the inference of a causal nexus
between the racially-offensive actions and the adverse action."); see also Stone, Shortcuts,
supra note 73, at 136-37 ("[C]ourts adjudicating claims of employment discrimination
brought under federal statutes have routinely excluded evidence at trial or refused to accord
evidence of biased comments enough weight to stave off a grant of summary judgment for
the employer without any thought as to what probative value or insight they might have
provided-simply because an arbitrary time limit had been exceeded."); Stone, Taking in
Strays, supra note 73 (examining the stray remarks doctrine).
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about women, and about her in particular for being a certain type of woman-
one who was too "put together" to be seen as taking her career seriously. 1
40
However, because she could not proffer an attitude as evidence, and the
comments she can proffer are simply too few, far between, and diffuse (not
directed at the plaintiff), she would likely be unable to propel a "because of'
claim forward. Ironically, it is the awareness of sex discrimination generated by
high profile cases like Price Waterhouse that chills a good deal of overtly
prejudiced or inflammatory speech. Consequently, much of the way sex
discrimination is expressed is muted, more infrequent, and subtle, thus making it
difficult for existing law to detect or capture. 141
It is also unlikely that the associate would have a viable claim of actionable
sexual harassment under Title VII. An actionable hostile workplace exists when
one's workplace environment becomes rife with ridicule, humiliation, or other
abuse that can be said to be "because of sex." 142 To have a cognizable claim, the
alleged harassment must be severe or pervasive, the behavior must subjectively
affect the plaintiff, the behavior must objectively affect a reasonable person in
her shoes, and there must be a basis for employer liability. 143 In this particular
case, because there were relatively few comments made, 144 a small proportion of
140. See Complaint, Laskis v. Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP, supra note 116, at 5 ("[He] told her
that they 'didn't think she wanted to be partner' and that she 'must be more than a pretty
face.' He told Ms. Laskis to 'show ME you want this' and that she's 'not helping herself
coming to work looking well put together."').
141. See supra Part l.B.
142. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (Actionable sexual harassment occurs when the workplace is
"permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.").
143. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
(1998); Harris, 510 U.S. 17. Liability attaches to an employer when it is found to be
negligent in the maintenance of a workplace environment in which coworker or peer
harassment is permitted to occur. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. Where supervisory harassment
occurs, liability may be imputed to the employer where it is accompanied by a tangible
employment action, like a termination or demotion. Id. Even where there is no tangible
employment action, a supervisor's harassment gives rise to a cause of action against his
employer unless the defendant can successfully assert an affirmative defense maintaining
that it had reasonable policies and procedures in place, and the plaintiff unreasonably failed
to avail herself of them. Id.
144. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 10-15090, 2012 WL 335629, at *4 (11th Cir.
Feb. 3, 2012) ("Guthrie's evidence-alleging only a few dozen comments or actions by
Lawery and Barnett, spread out over a period of eleven months.., failed to show that the
alleged harassment was sufficiently frequent to support her claim."); Morris v. City of Colo.
Springs, 666 F.3d 654 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that a "reasonable jury could not determine
that Ms. Morris experienced a hostile work environment due to sexual discrimination
[because t]here is no indication that the relatively isolated incidents in this case 'altered the
terms or conditions of [Ms. Morris's] employment and created an abusive working
environment."'); Vajdl v. Mesabi Acad. of KidsPeace, Inc., 484 F.3d 546, 551-52 (8th Cir.
2007) (concluding that isolated comments and touchings were not sufficiently pervasive);
Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
"five separate incidents of allegedly sexually-oriented, offensive comments either directed to
[the plaintiff] or made in her presence in a sixteen month period" did not amount to
actionable sexual harassment).
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which were made directly to or about the plaintiff, 145 and they were made over
such a long period of time, any claim based upon a hostile workplace
environment would probably be disposed of on summary judgment due to a lack
of harassment severe or pervasive enough to meet the standard. 146 This does not
comport with the reality that the associate probably found those comments to be
degrading and severe. Some in her shoes might just as easily havc sought out
another job, perhaps trading status or compensation for dignity and a fair chance
to achieve the highest levels.
The associate's case presents an all too common scenario in the modem
workplace. A member of a protected class works for or around others who
harbor negative attitudes about members of that class. These attitudes then
manifest themselves in the form of hateful speech, or may result in a crass
workplace environment full of vulgarities. The problem arises, however, when
the perpetrators of the hateful speech or vulgar environment act in a way that
erodes the progress, well-being, and success of class members while evading
liability or another form of deterrence. Yes, Title VII is not a civility code. 147
However, Title VII's primary objective is to rid the workplace of discrimination
that excludes class members from unfettered opportunity to enter into and
advance in the workplace. 148 This goal is wholly thwarted when the law is
reluctant or unable to keep pace with (1) evolving evidence of the effect of
abusive speech and expression on both the dynamics of workplace decision
making and individuals' abilities to thrive in the workplace; (2) the changing
demographics of the workplace which, while good in terms of evincing increased
diversity, can obscure instances in which discrimination occurs; and (3) the more
suppressed, nuanced expression of biased speech borne of widespread awareness
145. See, e.g., White v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., No. 10-31105, 2012 WL 13783, at *5 (5th Cir. Jan
4, 2012) (holding that there was no cognizable claim for harassment because, among other
reasons, "the 'ni*ger' comment was not directed at" the plaintiff); Alexander v. Opelika City
Schs., 352 F. App'x 390, 393 (1 1th Cir. 2009) (holding that any purported harassment
suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the terms and
conditions of his employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act because,
among other reasons, the comment about how to tie a noose around a person's neck was not
directed at the plaintiff). But see Harris v. Mayor and City Council of Bait., 429 F. App'x
195, 201 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Petrosino v. Bell AtI., 385 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir. 2004))
("The fact that much of this offensive material was not directed specifically at [the
claimant] ... does not, as a matter of law, preclude a jury from finding that the conduct
subjected [the claimant] to a hostile work environment based on her sex.").
146. See e.g., Chancellor v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
147. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
148. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) ("The objective of Congress in
the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees."); David S. Schwartz, When is
Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1697, 1743 (2002) (discussing "Title VII's goal of full workplace integration of traditionally
excluded groups"); Harvard Law Review Association, Title VII-Gender-Specific Fetal
Protection Policies: UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 105 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (1991)
(labeling Title VII's goals as "work force integration, pay equality, and equal opportunity").
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of anti-discrimination law and the taboo nature of explicit racist or misogynistic
speech in modem times.
It is ironic, indeed, that a woman like the associate, afforded the
opportunity to attend Harvard Law School and to commence her career at a
prestigious firm in an era in which the high rate of such occurrences for women
is unprecedented, looks to have a more difficult time proving discrimination than
did Ann Hopkins. Whereas, based upon the facts available, both clearly worked
with and were evaluated by men who harbored stereotyped and negative
impressions of women, Ann Hopkins, climbing the corporate ladder in the
1980s, won her case. Concededly, Ann Hopkins had more comments made
directly to her and about her in the context of her candidacy for partnership than
did the associate. That said, based upon the evidence the associate had, she
should have been able to establish that she was being judged through the lens of
gender bias. More than anything else, what loomed large over her case was the
context in which it occurred: her evaluation and termination occurred in the
midst of a bad economy, in a situation in which she had, presumably, been
educated, worked, and terminated alongside relatively equal numbers of men and
women. Moreover, while the comments that she alleges her supervisor made to
and around her positively bespeak a gender bias, the comments were neither as
direct nor explicitly sexist as those made to Ann Hopkins. For these reasons, it is
likely that her case would not have survived summary judgment; a judge likely
would have found that there was no triable issue in dispute as to either a
"because of' claim based on her termination, or any sexual harassment claim.
C. Unconscious Bias
But should a case like the associate's survive? The news is rife with stories
about women who bemoan the "general attitude" of their supervisors or
employers toward women. 149 Is this a problem that can, or even should, be
redressed by the law? The notion that a new, perhaps more evolved, form of
sexism than the more blatant sexism Title VII was passed to eradicate, may have
149. See Melissa J. Anderson, Firms Must Employ Transparency to Eliminate Hidden Bias
against Female Leaders, THE GLASS HAMMER (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://www.theglasshammer.com/news/2011/04/27/firms-must-employ-transparency-to-
eliminate-hidden-bias-against-female-leaders/; Victoria Pynchon, Working Mothers Pose
Fewer Burdens for Employers Than Their Coworkers, FORBES ONLINE (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/shenegotiates/2012/02/13/working-mothers-pose-fewer-
burdens-on-employers-than-do-their-coworkers/ ("There must be something about gender
roles nested in the anger employers express when describing the burdens they have to endure
for the benefit of their pregnant and working mother employees."); Gayle Tzemack
Lemmon, "I'm Not Your Wife!" A New Study Points to a Hidden Form of Sexism, ABOVE
THE LAW (June 5, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/06/im-not-your-
wife-a-new-study-points-to-a-hidden-form-of-sexism/258057/ (noting Harvard research
fellow and UNC Assistant Professor Sreedhari Desai's assertion "that so many of the
attitudes her work unveils are of an 'unconscious nature,' which makes beating them back
particularly difficult. She says male leaders may think they are elevating women, not stifling
them.").
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taken hold in the contemporary workplace has certainly started to enter the
public's consciousness. 50 It has not necessarily captured the public's interest,
though. Perhaps, sexist comments are not being made as often, as loudly, or as
bluntly as they once were, but sexist attitudes, long entrenched and reinforced by
attitudes cultivated in the media, popular culture, and even employees' own
homes, persist and continue to color and influence the way women are seen and
treated in the workplace.
Countless works inside and outside of legal scholarship have tried to draw
attention to issues surrounding the development, expression, and consequences
of subconscious or unconscious bias.151 Some courts have delved into this
literature and attempted to come to the right results, or at least answer the correct
questions, when adjudicating sex discrimination and sexual harassment suits,
particularly at the summary judgment stage. 152 But when deep-rooted biases take
the form of behavior that cannot easily be forced into the traditional frameworks
for claims (because of infrequent but telling comments, vulgar, or disrespectful
behavior not necessarily targeted at the plaintiff, etc.), patterns of exclusion
persist, despite the lofty goals of the statutes in place.
In a newly published research paper entitled "Marriage Structure and
Resistance to the Gender Revolution in the Workplace," researchers from
Harvard, New York University, and the University of Utah sought to answer the
question of whether adherents to the "traditional" American family and its
assigned gender roles could simultaneously function in a truly fair and impartial
manner at work. Defining a "traditional marriage" as one in which the wife does
not work outside the home and a "modem marriage" as one in which the wife
does work outside the home, the paper examined the fact that, despite eaming
more advanced degrees and having more employment opportunities, women
have failed to make their way into the highest ranks of employment. 153 The
150. See Lindsay Cross, There's an Unconscious Bias Against Working Mothers. Let's Talk about
It., THE GRINDSTONE (Feb. 14, 2012), http://thegrindstone.com/work-life-balance/lets-talk-
about-a-companys-responsibility-to-working-mothers-7 10/.
151. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1245-46
(1995); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA.
L. REV. 741, 743 (2005); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006); Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 481, 483-86 (2005); Ann C.
McGinley, iViva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 420 (2000); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of
Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 657, 658-59 (2003); Franita
Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: Firm-Based Remedies in
Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347 (2008).
152. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34
F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1994); Thomas v. Cal. State Dep't of Corr., No. 91-15870, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20346, at *8-9 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 1992); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1273
(10th Cir. 1988); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Lim v.
Trustees of Ind. Univ., No. IP-99-0419-C-M/S, 2001 WL 1912634 (S.D. Ind. 2001).
153. Sreedhari D. Desai, Dolly Chugh & Arthur Brief, Marriage Structure and Resistance to the
Gender Revolution in the Workplace (Mar. 12, 2012), available at
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paper reported that "husbands embedded in traditional and neo-traditional
marriages (relative to husbands embedded in modem ones) exhibit attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors that undermine the role of women in the workplace." 154 It
concluded that
employed husbands in traditional marriages, compared to those in modem
marriages, tend to (a) view the presence of women in the workplace
unfavorably; (b) perceive that organizations with higher numbers of female
employees are operating less smoothly; (c) find organizations with female
leaders as relatively unattractive; and (d) deny, more frequently, qualified
female employees opportunities for promotion. 155
The researchers further concluded that the viewpoints and structure of the
personal lives, families, and worlds of the men who captain industry and their
personal viewpoints ultimately contour the treatment of women in the
workplace. 156 Those who are the most highly compensated in our society and
who typically make decisions at the highest levels of our institutions more often
have the economic means to be part of a single wage-earner family, while those
further down the ladder often could not make ends meet as part of a single wage-
earner family. Indelibly etched into the worldviews of some men whose wives
do not work outside the home, it seems, may be the notion that women in the
office who seek advancement do not and should not have prospects as bright as
similarly situated men. Confronted with, for example, the results of experiments
in which subjects presented with identical hypothetical candidates given female
versus male names preferred the male candidates over the females, 157 it is
difficult to deny or to decry the validity of modem fears of unequal treatment
evinced only in ways that are difficult to use as viable evidence in a lawsuit.
Further, these results compel investigation into issues like how women are
viewed and treated in environments in which the men who run them see nothing
wrong with consuming and imitating media, such as radio shows, websites, and
publications, in the workplace that exploit and demean women as a group.
These researchers are optimistic about future investigations. According to a
popular blog, when one of the authors of the research paper on marriage
structure and resistance to the gender rebellion was interviewed, she expressed
hope that her work "will help leaders think about the best way to form teams and
consider what invisible barriers might be holding back some of their top
talent." 158 She further noted that many of the attitudes her work uncovers are of





157. Tzemach Lemmon, supra note 149.
158. Id.
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difficult."'
159
The New York Times recently used a story about a sex discrimination suit
to pose the question: "[A]re [Silicon Valley] men trapped in the past even as they
create the future?"' 160 The suit was against a major venture capital firm in Silicon
Valley in which the plaintiff allegedly faced retaliation after she rejected sexual
advances in the workplace. In addition to alleging facts about her specific plight,
the plaintiffs complaint painted a very grim picture of women's prospects at her
workplace. In the complaint, the plaintiff described how she was told that
women would not succeed at her workplace "because women are quiet," and that
women were excluded from important business dinners, because they would
"kill the buzz."' 16 1 The Times reported that the firm discriminated against women
"by failing to promote them comparably to men, by compensating them less than
men through lower salary, bonus and carried interest, [and] by restricting the
number of investments that women are allowed to make as compared to men." 162
The Times noted that the suit was "exposing an uncomfortable truth about
Silicon Valley: starting tech companies in 2012 is still a male game, and so is
funding them." 163 It explored the fact that the plaintiffs complaint probed
beyond the facts at issue to depict venture capitalists in Silicon Valley as "a
group of 21st-century men who may be hard at work building the 22nd century
but, when it comes to dealing with women in the workplace, are stuck firmly in
the caveman era--or at least in the 1950s."' 64 What emerges, the Times
concluded, commenting on the broader male-dominated workplace culture of
Silicon Valley, was "a portrait that many women in tech find all too familiar."
' 65
What the female professionals in the field interviewed for the article
described was neither a series of discrete, readily identifiable and actionable
incidents, nor was it a pattern of actionable harassment. They described a
confluence of factors, including the idea of an attitude projected by those for
whom they work and the relative dearth of women in their field and at the
general helm of the industry. 166 Indeed, women make up a mere 9.1 percent of
the board members of Silicon Valley companies, a considerably lower
percentage than Standard & Poor's 500 companies, where 16 percent of board
members are women. 167 Moreover, as recently as 2009, a mere 11 percent of
companies on the receiving end of venture backing had a female CEO or
159. Id.











founder. 168 One woman recounted that if "[y]ou talk to any woman in
technology... she will have a personal story or know a story where she felt
conscious of her gender in subtle or significant ways." 1
69
D. The Effect of Abusive Speech on Employees
As previously discussed, not all speech or behavior that one might consider
gendered or discriminatory will be deemed unlawful by a court. 170 Difficulties in
meeting standards of proof, high evidentiary thresholds set forth by judges using
adjudicatory frameworks, and definitions of terms like "harassment" that call for
precise and high standards to be met, all work to impede Title VII's ability to
eradicate such speech and behavior from the workplace. 171 Nonetheless, this
speech has clear deleterious and demoralizing effects on employees. 172
The psychological impact of abusive, discriminatory speech should not be
underestimated. Research studies show that workplace morale, as well as
individual employees' psyche, productivity, and mental health, are all threatened
by abusive, discriminatory workplace speech. 173 One study, for example,
explored the link between self-reported workplace discrimination and depressive
symptoms among hospital employees from diverse ethnic backgrounds.' 74 The
study found that African American employees were more likely than members of
other racial or ethnic groups to report frequent discrimination experiences and
that the frequency of workplace discrimination was positively associated with
depressive symptoms.' 75 It concluded that "[r]educing workplace discrimination
may improve psychosocial functioning among racial/ethnic minority hospital
employees at greatest risk of exposure."' 176 The study's authors associated the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Pat K. Chew, Freeing Racial Harassment from the Sexual Harassment Model, 85 OR. L.
REV. 615, 621 (2006) (citing L. Camille H1bert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace
Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 848-66 (1997)) (noting that "courts ... impose a
very high standard for 'severe or pervasive' [sexual] harassment.., and find even explicit
sexually related behavior to be not motivated by sex").
171. See Susan J. Best, Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of Action Under a 'Sex-Plus' Theory, 30 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 211, 222 (2009); Megan S. Glowacki, On the Job and Off: Why Evidence of
a Hostile Work Environment Should Never Clock Out, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 351, 351 (2009).
172. Ellen A. Ensher et al., Effects of Perceived Discrimination on Job Satisfaction,
Organizational Commitment, Organizational Citizenship Behavior, and Grievances, 12
HUM. RESOURCE DEV. Q. 53 (2001), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/55985284/Effects-of-Perceived-Discrimination.
173. See, e.g., Kamaldeep Bhui et al., Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Common Mental
Disorders Among Workers: Findings From the EMPIRIC Study of Ethnic Minority Groups
in the United Kingdom, 95(3) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 496 (2005), available at
http://ajph.aphapublications.org/cgi/reprint/95/3/496.pdf, Ensher et al., supra note 172;
Wizdom Powell Hammond et al., Workplace Discrimination and Depressive Symptoms: A
Study of Multi-Ethnic Hospital Employees, 2 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 19 (2010), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2867471.
174. Hammond et al., supra note 173.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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occurrence, kinds, and frequency of discrimination in the workplace with
depressive symptoms above and well beyond that of simple job strain or general
social stress. 177 The authors also found that their study reaffirmed earlier
findings that workplace discrimination's effect on mental health is distinct from
the effects of other occupational and psychological stressors on employees. 1
78
Another study in the United Kingdom further reinforces this idea. In this
study, discrimination was defined as "reports of insults; unfair treatment at work;
or job denial stemming from race, religion, or language."1 79 The study found that
members of ethnic minorities who reported unfair treatment had the highest
likelihood of developing mental disorders. 180 Still, another study found that
coworker, supervisory, and organizational discrimination all affect factors like
employee job satisfaction, attitude toward and commitment to the organization,
and organizational citizenship behavior. 181 Specifically, those employees who
perceived greater discrimination from their coworkers were found less likely to
engage in informal, "prosocial" behaviors, while employees who perceived
discrimination from the organization generally reported less organizational
commitment and less job satisfaction. 182 Although these studies dealt specifically
with racial or ethnic minority groups exposed to abusive speech, women in the
workplace are similarly experiencing noncognizable abusive speech that
implicates similar workplace disadvantages.' 
83
It is well established that enterprises that retain and manage diversity
effectively enjoy, among other things, increased productivity, higher retention
rates, and a greater capability to recruit high achieving applicants.184 However,
discrimination, as well as behavior that employees perceive as discriminatory,
may have an impact on employee behavior, job tension, decreased job
satisfaction, and loyalty. 185 Indeed, perceived discrimination against women has
been associated with a diminished sense of occupational power and prestige. 
186
On one hand, the numbers of women who are, for example, graduating
from top graduate schools, or commencing employment each year at law firms,
medical practices, businesses, and other workplaces, are at their highest rates in
history-largely because of the inroads to equality forged by legislation like
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Kamaldeep Bhui et al., supra note 173.
180. Id. at 499.
181. Ensher et al., supra note 172.
182. Id. at 66-67.
183. See generally Rachael Rettner, 6 Ways Sexual Harassment Damages Women's Health,
MYHEALTHDAILYNEWS.COM (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.myhealthnewsdaily.com/1884-
sexual-harassment-health-effects.html; Sexual Harassment: Effects of Sexual Harassment,
MINNESOTA ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/svaw/harassment/explore/4effects.htm.
184. Ensher et al., supra note 172, at 53.
185. Id. at 57.
186. Id.
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Title VII. "' In fact, women make up nearly half of a typical entering class at a
professional school or typical large firm. 88 On the other hand, women are
conspicuously underrepresented in and absent from the highest leadership and
• 189
most senior levels of employer enterprises. Thus, while discrimination may be
operating less to keep historically marginalized groups out of the workplace,
discriminatory sentiments and perceived discrimination, not all of which are
prosecuted or even necessarily actionable, are now operating to weed these
group members out of the workforce. 1
90
To illustrate this point, a 1996 study concluded that, while perceived race
discrimination among black women did not keep them from entering the labor
market, it did impede their level of on-the-job engagement and lower their odds
of rising up through the ranks of their respective organizations. 191 The subjects'
levels of work-related stress were raised by their perception of racial
discrimination on the job. 192 This perception also curtailed their skill-honing and
development, and was connected to the interpersonal dynamics of their
workplace relationships and coworker and supervisory interactions. 193 In
contrast, behavior indicative of good organization citizenship seems, according
to researchers, to stem from an employee's sense that she is being treated fairly
and is rewarded for loyalty.'1 94 Thus, an environment poisoned by the toxicity of
a discriminatory culture or discriminatory sentiments will engender a weakness
in interpersonal relationships, which will in turn foster a lack of commitment or
engagement on employees' parts. 195
The effects of even perceived discrimination look to be almost as
inescapable as they are harmful. It is the case, however, that very successful
187. See, e.g., Christen Linke Young, Childbearing, Childrearing, and Title VII: Parental Leave
Policies at Large American Law Firms, 118 YALE L.J. 1182, 1186 (2009) ("Today, women
make up 49% of new associates."); NATHAN E. BELL, ENROLLMENT AND DEGREES IN
PROFESSIONAL SCIENCE MASTER'S (PSM) PROGRAMS: 2010, available at
http://www.cgsnet.org/portals/0/pdf/RED2009.pdf (showing various tables indicating that
females are attaining more doctorate degrees than males); NEW YORK CITY BAR, LAW FIRM
DIVERSITY BENCHMARKING REPORT 2006 REPORT TO SIGNATORIES OF THE STATEMENT OF
DIVERSITY PRINCIPLES 8-9 (2008) (stating that "[a]t the top 20 law schools, over one-quarter
of 2005 graduates were racial/ethnic minorities (26%) and nearly one-half were women
(46%)," and providing data indicating that "over one in five associates are racial-ethnic
minorities and over two in five are women").
188. Id.
189. See Brian Burnsed, Business Schools Hope to Shatter Sturdy Glass Ceiling, U.S. NEWS (June
15, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-business-
schools/artic les/20 1/06/1 5/business-schools-hope-to-shatter-sturdy-glass-cei ing; see also
Young, supra note 187, at 1186-87.
190. See Vickie M. Mays et al., Perceived Race-Based Discrimination, Employment Status, and
Job Stress in a National Sample of Black Women: Implications for Health Outcomes, 1(3) J.
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people who are among those most invested in their achievement have been
posited to be most likely to stereotype threat. 96 Stereotype threat occurs when
people fear that their performance failures, as gauged by some measure, will be
generated by a negative stereotype about a group to which they belong, rather
than their own actual performance.' 97 Because these individuals fear that their
own personal evaluations will "serve as a referendum on the abilities of everyone
in their group ... the stress and self-doubt this brings on demonstrably reduces
their performance-creating the very outcome they were striving to avoid." 198
IV. REDEFINING TITLE VII
The real question is how, despite Title VII being in its sixth decade of
existence, 199while so many believe our society has socially evolved to the point
of being "post race" and "post gender"200 and with equal opportunity spreading
to the point that those gaining entry into the professional arena are more diverse
than any group or generation has been, 20 1 the status gap continues to persist at
the highest levels of employment.20 2 This Article posits that while factors like
196. Carrie Conaway, A Psychological Effect of Stereotypes, 2005 REGIONAL REV. 40, 40,
available at www.bos.frb.org/economic/nerr/rr2005/q I /section3c.pdfi
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-16 (2006).
200. See Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity
Rationale, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 586-87 (2011) ("Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's
presidential bid and Associate Justices Sonia Sotomayor's and Elena Kagan's appointments
by President Obama to the Supreme Court have fueled media coverage about whether the
United States has become a 'post-gender' or 'post-racial' society"); Jessica A. Clarke,
Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219,
1224-25 (2011) (stating that "[t]he race between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for the
2008 Democratic nomination for president caused many to ask whether the United States has
moved beyond equality"); TYRONE FORMAN, BEYOND PREJUDICE? YOUNG WHITES'
RACIAL ATTITUDES IN POST CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA, 1976 (2010), available at
http://userwww.service.emory.edu/-tforman/working/Forman-Beyond-Prej udice-Web.pdf
("In fact, a cursory review of news articles might lead one to conclude that young Whites
have moved completely beyond the prejudicial attitudes espoused by their parents and
grandparents to become truly colorblind."); Stephanie Sipe et al., University Students'
Perceptions of Gender Discrimination in the Workplace: Reality Versus Fiction, 84.6 J.
EDUC. & BUS. 339 (2009) (finding that students believe they are entering a gender-neutral
workplace).
201. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, DIVERSITY IN LAW FIRMS, 3
(2003), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/reports/diversitylaw/lawfirms.pdf
(stating that "[s]ince 1970, the gender and race composition of elite law firms has changed
considerably at the associate level. By 1980, 23.2% of the associates in the sample were
women; by 1990, 36.2% of associates in the sample were women. Although the level of
racial diversity is much lower, it too has increased. By 1980, 3.6% of associates in the
sample were minorities; by 1990, 6.5% of associates were minorities").
202. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2009, 1-2
(2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2009.pdf (stating that "[a]lthough
women are more likely than men to work in professional and related occupations, they are
not as well represented in the higher paying job groups within this broad category. In 2009,
only 9 percent of female professionals, compared with 43 percent of male professionals,
were employed in the relatively high paying computer and engineering fields.").
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having children and choosing to leave the workforce or face work/life balance
difficulties and prejudice are partially to blame, 20 3 there is another, overlooked,
explanation for why women are being winnowed out as they climb the ranks
toward greater earnings and professional power. The culture of too many
workplaces operates to alienate and exclude women while evading capture by
existing law.
Federal workplace legislation, and the resulting culture of compelled
tolerance and "political correctness" has eradicated a great deal of overt
discrimination, exclusion, and harassment from the workplace. 204 Yet, a residual
category of deleterious class-based interference with the terms and conditions of
employment remains untouched by current law. This category is seemingly
deemed unworthy of a designation as invidious by those who write, interpret,
and otherwise shape the law. This interference comes in the form of expressed
attitudes, language, and behavior that tends to undermine, degrade, or alienate
members of protected classes, like race or gender, while failing to meet the
criteria that is traditionally ascribed to unlawful workplace behavior. This
includes speech or behaviors directly targeting a victim, even occurring
frequently, nevertheless being deemed as not being "because of sex" or "because
of race," or not conferring enough harm simply because it is more subtle,
nuanced, or suggestive than that which had been previously deemed unlawful.
2 °5
A. Abusive Workplace Speech
Nonactionable abusive workplace speech quietly, but steadily, erodes the
confidence, morale, and performance of women in the workplace. This speech
must thus be identified and examined to ascertain whether the law's extant
boundary between what is considered lawful bullying and what is considered
unlawful class-based discrimination is furthering the broad remedial goals of
Title VII.
Abusive workplace speech is typically rendered nonactionable for one of
two reasons. It may be deemed too unfocused or not directed enough to the
203. Sipe et al., supra note 200 ("Five major factors affect women's ability to excel in their
careers and get past the glass ceiling. These impediments include stereotypes and
perceptions, mentoring and networking availability, discrimination in the workplace, family
issues, and funding availability.").
204. See lrina V. Nirshberg, Prior Restraint on Speech and Workplace Discrimination: The
Clashing of Two Fundamental Rights, 34 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 577, 593 (2001) ("The work
environment soon became a forum for political correctness because employers quickly
realized the threats of litigation arising out of Title VII and other state employment
statutes.").
205. See Smith v. Naples Comm. Hosp., Inc., No. 2:08-cv-952-FtM-29SPC, 2010 WL 2026163
(M.D. Fla. 2010); Guthrie v. Waffle House, Inc., 460 Fed. Appx. 803 (11th Cir. 2012);
Woods v. Austal, U.S.A., LLC, No. 09-0699-WS-N, 2011 WL 1380054 (S.D. Ala. 2011)
("To be sure, [plaintiffs] evidence is that [defendant] treated him harshly, yelled at him, and
'rode him' in a way that he did not do to other workers. But friction or personal animosity
between supervisor and subordinate does not equate to a racially hostile work
environment.").
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plaintiff to affect her in her work, or "because of' her protected-class status. It
also may not be considered severe or pervasive enough to be deemed actionable
harassment. Additionally, if the plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action,
and a "because of' claim is made, speech that may very well belie discriminatory
intent, or even animus, may be disregarded because it is deemed "stray" or too
temporally remote. Numerous scholars have bemoaned the failure of courts to
discern intent to harass or actual harassment from one or more revealing
comments.
In the following scenario, a decision maker's workplace speech, whether or
not directed at a specific employee, repeatedly belies his systemic stereotyping
of a discrete protected class or his biased beliefs about it.
i. Reeves
Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. is one recent example of a case in
which the judiciary started to critique and rethink the traditional boundaries of
Title VII. In this en banc opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a grant of summary judgment to a defendant employer on a Title VII
claim that the district court deemed too legally deficient to proceed to trial.2 °7
In Reeves, the plaintiff, a sales representative named Ingrid Reeves,
resigned from her job-driven out, she claimed, by the sexually hostile
workplace environment in which she was forced to work.20 8 Ms. Reeves, the
only woman on the sales floor alongside six male coworkers, claimed that she
had been subjected to hearing her coworkers use explicit, vulgar, and derogatory
language when speaking over the phone or with one another, or listening to the
radio. 2 9 While, as the court recited, Ms. Reeves was "no stranger to the coarse
language endemic to the transportation industry," frequently using "generic
swear words," herself, she was consistently subjected to a workplace culture rife
with words that were "unusually offensive," though not typically, "gender-
specific., 2 10 She was also, however, consistently exposed to
gender-derogatory language addressed specifically to women as a group in the
workplace. Her coworkers used such language to refer to or to insult individual
females with whom they spoke on the phone or who worked in a separate area
of the branch. Although not speaking to Reeves specifically, Reeves said that
her male coworkers referred to individuals in the workplace as "bitch,"
"fucking bitch," "fucking whore," "crack whore," and "cunt." [One]
206. 594 F.3d 798 (11 th Cir. 2010).
207. Id. at 803.
208. Id. at 806.
209. Id. at 803-06.
210. Id. at 803-04. For example, "[hier coworkers, she claimed, regularly used curse words such
as 'fuck,' 'fucker,' and 'asshole.' Id. at 804. They used the intensely offensive epithet 'Jesus
fucking Christ,' and the terms 'fucking asshole,' 'fucking jerk,' and 'fucking idiot.' Id. They
also discussed sexual topics such as masturbation and bestiality." Id.
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coworker... frequently shouted the epithets "fucking bitch" or "fucking
whore" after hanging up his phone. He also called one woman a "cunt."
Indeed, Reeves's supervisor ... often referred to his female colleagues by the
term "bitch." Among other examples offered, he ordered Reeves to speak with
"that stupid bitch on line 4," and described a former female colleague ... as a
"lazy, good-for-nothing bitch."211
Moreover, Ms. Reeves was daily forced to hear "a crude morning show" on
the office radio.2 12 This show "featured ... regular discussions of women's
anatomy, a graphic discussion of how women's nipples harden in the cold, and
conversations about the size of women's breasts. 21 3 Ms. Reeves was also
subjected to crude and pornographic images displayed on coworkers' computer
screens and her coworkers' singing about subjects that the court termed "gender
derogatory."
' 214
While Ms. Reeves was never personally singled out for targeted sex-based
abuse, she was forced to observe her only female coworker in her branch be
subjected to this treatment, as other coworkers called her a "bitch" and made
crude comments about her anatomy.2 5 Further, despite Ms. Reeves's frequent
objections to the cruel, demeaning, and degrading behavior she was forced to
observe, she claimed that
this offensive conduct occurred "on a daily basis." She testified that "if you
were to pull out a calendar right now and I were to look at, you know, summer
of 2001 to spring of '04, I could point at every day of the year that some of this
behavior went on. It went on every day." She indicated that "this type of
phrase, 'You fucking whore,' was commonplace."
' 216
Indeed, Ms. Reeves's coworkers made it clear to her that her protests
would be to no avail and she testified that it was obvious to her that complaining
to coworkers was not bringing about results, and that "'nothing ever
changed."' 2 17 She further noted that a coworker once told her to wear her
earplugs so he could behave "'any way he liked."' 218 Even her complaints to
management fell on deaf ears. 219 Her supervisor conceded that while he had
promised to pay more attention to the language and behavior Ms. Reeves was
forced to endure, it "did not stop."' 22 ° Moreover, he acknowledged that he failed
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responsibility to do so. 22 1 When Ms. Reeves went further up the chain of
command to complain to corporate executives, she found them similarly
nonresponsive. 222
Ms. Reeves eventually resigned and sued her former employer, alleging
that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment. 223 When the district
court granted summary judgment against her, it found that there was insufficient
evidence of an actionably hostile environment. 224 The court reasoned that
because the derogatory language was not directed to her in particular and
because the language was used and the radio program was played in front of all
employees, both men and women were afforded equal treatment. 225 Thus, the
court held that the plaintiff was never "'intentionally singled out for adverse
treatment because of her sex.'
226
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that "Title VII is not a civility code,"
and the "bedrock principle" that "not all profane or sexual language or conduct
will constitute discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment." 227 It
also acknowledged that the objectives of Title VII nonetheless call for "the
removal of employment obstacles, not required by business necessity, which
create 'built-in headwinds' and freeze out protected groups from job
opportunities and advancement." 228 Ultimately, the court found that
a member of a protected group cannot be forced to endure pervasive,
derogatory conduct and references that are gender-specific in the workplace,
just because the workplace may be otherwise rife with generally indiscriminate
vulgar conduct. Title VII does not offer boorish employers a free pass to
discriminate against their employees specifically on account of gender just
because they have tolerated pervasive but indiscriminate profanity as well.
229
Emphasizing the importance of evaluating claims and circumstances in
context, the court engaged in a granular analysis that distinguished between
language that is truly generically vulgar and offensive and language that may
seem commonplace and generic, but operates to harm women because of sex:
Even gender-specific terms cannot give rise to a cognizable Title VII claim if
used in a context that plainly has no reference to gender. Thus, for example,
were a frustrated sales representative to shout "Son-of-a-bitch! They lost that
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a coworker calls a female employee a "bitch," the word is gender-
derogatory.... [T]he terms "bitch" and "slut" are "more degrading to women
than to men." The original definition of the term "bitch" is "the female of the
dog." The term's secondary meanings are likewise gender-specific: "a lewd or
immoral woman" or "a malicious, spiteful, and domineering woman." Calling
a female colleague a "bitch" is firmly rooted in gender. It is humiliating and
degrading based on sex.
230
Similarly, the context may illuminate whether the use of an extremely vulgar,
gender-neutral term such as "fucking" would contribute to a hostile work
environment. "Fucking" can be used as an intensifying adjective before
gender-specific epithets such as "bitch." In that context, "fucking" is used to
strengthen the attack on women, and is therefore relevant to the Title VII
analysis. However, the obscene word does not itself afford a gender-specific
meaning. Thus, when used in context without reference to gender, "fuck" and
"fucking" fall more aptly under the rubric of general vulgarity that Title VII
does not regulate. 231
Significantly, the court held that where speech and behavior are amply
gender-specific and sufficiently severe or pervasive, a plaintiff may have a viable
hostile environment claim, even if she was not the direct target of the speech or
behavior. 232 As the court put it, "[i]t is enough to hear coworkers on a daily basis
refer to female colleagues as 'bitches,' 'whores' and 'cunts,' to understand that
they view women negatively, and in a humiliating or degrading way. The
harasser need not close the circle with reference to the plaintiff specifically: 'and
you are a "bitch," too.''233 The court also noted that language or behavior that
appears to be generally vulgar, but consistently paints a protected class as the
target or object of humiliation, exploitation, or belittling, does discriminate
against the group's members by uniquely subjecting them to "disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment," as proscribed by Title VII.234 Moreover,
when group members, like the plaintiff, have their complaints ignored, this
disregard may be read as corporate ratification of the unlawful behavior. 235 As
the court concluded,
[i]f the environment.., had just involved a generally vulgar workplace whose
indiscriminate insults and sexually-laden conversation did not focus on the
gender of the victim, we would face a very different case. However, a
substantial portion of the words and conduct alleged in this case may
reasonably be read as gender-specific, derogatory, and humiliating .... A
230. Id. (internal citations omitted).
231. Id. at81On.4.
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jury... could find on this record that.., conduct in the office contributed to
conditions that were humiliating and degrading to women on account of their
gender .... The terms "whore," "bitch," and "cunt," the vulgar discussions of
women's breasts, nipples, and buttocks, and the pornographic image of a
woman in the office were each targeted at Reeves's gender. Like "bitch,"
"whore" is traditionally used to refer only to women.... The social context...
allows for the inference ... that the abuse did not amount to simple teasing,
offhand comments, or isolated incidents, but rather constituted repeated and
intentional discrimination directed at women as a group, if not at Reeves
specifically. It is not fatal to her claim that Reeves's coworkers never directly
called her a "bitch," a "fucking whore," or a "cunt."
' 236
The court further rejected the defendant's argument that where words that
appear to be targeted at women are used to refer to men and women alike, they
are divested of their discriminatory nature, noting that "[i]t is undeniable that the
terms 'bitch' and 'whore' have gender-specific meanings. Calling a man a
'bitch' belittles him precisely because it belittles women .... Indeed, it insults
the man by comparing him to a woman, and, thereby, could be taken as
humiliating to women as a group as well. 237
Reeves signifies a ground-breaking recognition by the judiciary of
principles and understandings that need to be advanced and implemented. First, a
woman need not be directly targeted for abuse in order to suffer an actionable
hostile workplace environment "because of' her sex.238 Second, language and
behavior that many are inclined to write off as generically vulgar or generally
offensive can be rife with implications that women as a group are inferior,
exploited, and unwelcome in the workplace. By humiliating and disparaging
women uniquely, such language and behavior operates to pervade and erode
individuals' sense of dignity and wellbeing in the workplace. It thus operates to
discriminate on the basis of sex, exposing only women to disadvantageous terms
and conditions of employment. Third, the mere fact that men and women alike
are being exposed to certain conduct or words does not mean that women are not
being discriminated against because of the significance of the language used or
the nature of the depictions embodied in the speech, among other things.
236. Id. at 811-12 (internal citations omitted).
237. Id. at 813.
238. Cf Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should Non-Targeted
Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable Under Title VII?, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1152, 1257
(2003) (stating that courts may "find non-targeted workplace sexual conduct actionable via
the disparate impact theory only if the conduct's disproportionate impact on women is
great"); L. Camille Hebert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive
Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 341, 345-46 (2005) (stating that in those harassment cases
where there is no targeted harassment, "disparate impact might appropriately be used to
challenge the sexually harassing behavior").
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ii. Post-Reeves
In the wake of Reeves, some district courts in the Eleventh Circuit seemed
to take heed of its lessons, cautioning defendants that despite Reeves' admonition
that general vulgarity does not rise to the level of harassment, "the mere fact that
there is evidence of personality conflicts and vulgar, but not sex-based
comments, does not diminish the fact that there were multiple, repeated sex-
based comments. 2 39 Many courts, however, have not learned the lessons in
Reeves. Even courts in the Eleventh Circuit, for whom Reeves is binding
authority, continue to grant summary judgment to defendants in cases involving
egregious, alienating, and abusive protected-class-based speech and behavior.
These courts have persisted in disaggregating evidence in ways that might seem
to contravene Reeves. 
240
In 2010, the district court that initially heard the Reeves case eschewed an
application of Reeves to a case in which the alleged harasser was described as a
misogynist who "could not work with intelligent, effective, powerful women,"
but could work with and did not have problems with "intelligent, effective,
powerful men.",241 The court acknowledged evidence that the defendant "treated
women differently than men in the workplace, that the different treatment was
based on gender, and that this different treatment was to the disadvantage of
women."'242 The court further clarified that it was not a situation in which women
were simply taking more offense at the conduct than men. Instead, the court
found evidence that the defendant did not "misbehave" around men, but did so
around women. 243
Despite these findings, the plaintiff's claims for sexual harassment,
discriminatory termination, and retaliation were all disposed of on summary
judgment. 244 The court found that the harassment the plaintiff faced was not
severe or pervasive, and, despite its mandate to construe evidence in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff and the court's own characterization of the
evidence, the court dismissed the behavior as "annoyances and communication
issues that do not come close to creating a hostile work environment., 245 For the
purposes of summary judgment, the court clearly divorced instances of the
plaintiff's poor treatment at the hands of her alleged harasser from the court's
own conclusion that he "was generally known... as a misogynist" who could
239. Yeomans v. Forster & Howell, Inc., No. 1:09cv488-WHA, 2010 WL 3716394, at *9 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 10, 2010).
240. See, e.g., Mason v. Mitchell's Contracting Serv., LLC, No. 10-411-CG-B, 2011 WL
4026652 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2011).
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not work with strong women. 246 Similarly, it relegated her recounting of his
targeting her with "aggressive, angry, and physically threatening" conduct to
"isolated screaming incidents" that did not sufficiently alter the conditions of
employment to create a hostile work environment. 247 The court refused to see
how even a handful of episodes of selective acting out could amount to behavior
that was severe or pervasive. 248 Finally, the fact that the plaintiff was terminated
in the course of a larger reduction in force ultimately proved fatal to her claims
for intentional discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation.249
Unfortunately, this happens all too often. Employers utilize reductions in force to
rid themselves of those whose protected-class status or protected activity has
made them undesirable, while obscuring the true motive amidst the termination
250
of many others.
In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment to a
defendant, finding that a plaintiff did not properly allege harassment that could
be seen as severe or pervasive despite evidence of lewd and clearly sex-based
abusive language, behavior, derision, and propositioning. 251 The court did this
based on a rote analysis of how many incidents occurred over a period of months
and a rather mechanical comparison to other cases in which the requirement had
or had not been found to have been met. 252 Infusing any more meaning into the
severe or pervasive requirement appeared to be out of the question, and the few
dozen comments or incidents alleged by the plaintiff to have occurred over a
period of eleven months would not suffice. A jury would never get to hear this
evidence.
In a 2011 district court case involving alleged racial harassment, the court
used a similar rationale for granting summary judgment to the defendant despite
its acknowledgment that the defendant "treated [the plaintiff] harshly, yelled at
him, and 'rode him' in a way that he did not do to other workers." 253 The court
dismissed as "friction or personal animosity" the plaintiff's allegations that he
was repeatedly called "boy," subjected to racist graffiti, confronted with a noose,
and surrounded by people in T-shirts bearing Confederate flags. 254 The
environment, construed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, appeared to be clearly racialized. Refusing to look at the aggregate
effect of the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, however, the
court found that "even if [the 'boy' comments] were evidence of racial animus,
[they] were infrequent and non-threatening, and plaintiff has made no showing
246. Id. at *15.
247. Id. at*19.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *26.
250. See id.
251. Guthrie v. Waffle House, Inc., 460 Fed. Appx. 803, 807 (11 th Cir. 2012).
252. See id. at 807-08.




that they interfered with his work performance." 255 Moreover, the court found
that
nothing in plaintiffs evidence of racial graffiti or Confederate t-shirts [sic]
shows that these types of occurrences were sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the terms or conditions of his employment...Woods' testimony
illuminated only a few examples of racial graffiti and was silent as to the
frequency with which he observed or heard about those kinds of racial symbols
being displayed on Austal property. The handful of instances of racial graffiti
that he observed in an Austal bathroom were vulgar and offensive, to be sure;
however, plaintiffs evidence is they amounted to mere offensive utterances,
not severe or threatening comments directed at him personally. And plaintiff
offers no evidence that exposure to sporadic racial slurs and symbols scrawled
on bathroom walls interfered with his work performance. The same is true of
the rope that Woods saw, which he perceived to be a noose, as well as the two
nooses about which he heard. Unquestionably, nooses are racially charged
symbols of hatred and oppression, particularly in the Deep South. But the
Eleventh Circuit has never held that the temporary display of a noose by a
rogue employee creates a per se hostile work environment.
256
Conclusory and almost defiant sounding, the court found that there was not
even a triable issue as to whether the allegations could possibly amount to severe
or pervasive harassment. 257
In another 2011 district court case in which the plaintiff alleged a racially
hostile work environment, the court attempted to apply Reeves to allegations that
after the plaintiff took a day off to observe Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, his
supervisor told him, "they should have killed four more n*ggers, and you would
have had the whole week off. ' 258 The plaintiff also alleged that his supervisor
"routinely addressed African American employees as 'n[*]gger,'
'motherfuckers,' and 'boy,' and used additional, unspecified profanity to 'speak
down' to African American employees., 259 The plaintiff further alleged that the
supervisor "stated that he did not want African Americans working for him, but
that he did not have a choice in the matter, and ... that he purchased a two
million dollar insurance policy because he knew that he would eventually 'get
caught' calling African Americans 'n[*]ggers' and 'bastards.'
260
The court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff had failed to set forth
a prima facie case of racial harassment alleging a hostile work environment. 261 It
255. Id. at *20.
256. Id.
257. Id. at*21.




261. Id. at 1195.
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emphasized that the supervisor in question never specifically directed the word
"n*gger" at the plaintiff, noting that while the plaintiff had testified that he
overheard the supervisor use the word, the supervisor's back was turned, and it
was not clear that the supervisor was aware that the plaintiff was in the room. 262
The court concluded that because the plaintiff's testimony did not establish that
the supervisor addressed employees with that word, the plaintiff could not claim
to have perceived a hostile environment with regard to that particular
allegation. 263 Whereas Reeves held that it was not necessary for the harasser to
reference the plaintiff specifically in order for the language to be seen as
affecting the conditions of employment, 264 the district court was quick to
presume that because the speaker's back was turned away from the plaintiff, and
the supervisor was seemingly unaware of the plaintiff's presence, the impact of
hearing his supervisor use the word n*gger was somehow mitigated. 265 This, and
the fact that the plaintiff's testimony only specified one incident of usage, wholly
discounted the presence of this incendiary word in the workplace.
266
Thus, while some courts have started to construe alleged harassment
against a backdrop of the actual effect that speech or behavior is likely to have
on an employee, the others need to follow suit if the real problem of the
disproportionate winnowing of women and other minorities from the workplace
due to alienation is ever to be addressed.
B. The First Amendment
There have always been those who contend that Title VII, as it has been
construed, might violate the First Amendment. Thus, some might raise concerns
about the First Amendment implications of an expanded Title VII and a more
holistic approach to determining whether speech and behavior meet the
requirements of actionable harassment.
Some notable scholars, such as Kingsley Browne and Eugene Volokh, have
argued that Title VII's general prohibition of workplace harassment may violate
the First Amendment. 267 Professor Browne maintains that Title VII harassment
regulation should be confined to cases that deal with unwanted physical contact,
to avoid running afoul of the First Amendment. 268 Professor Volokh, on the
other hand, advocates distinguishing between "directed" and "undirected"
262. Id. at 1192.
263. Id.
264. Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 811 (1 th Cir. 2010).
265. See Mason, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
266. Id.
267. Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment and the First
Amendment, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom
of Speech and Hostile Work Environment Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305
(1996).
268. Browne, supra note 267.
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expressions and finding only the former to be actionable. 269 Professor Browne
has argued that "evidence of protected speech should not be admitted at trial to
support a claim of hostile environment" and that holding employers liable for
their employees' speech may chill protected speech because "fear of litigation
and liability creates a powerful incentive for employers . . . to censor the speech
of their employees., 270 Even feminist scholars like Nadine Strossen have
maintained that, while Title VII does properly render some hate speech
prohibited, "[t]o broaden the range of prohibited hate speech would not only
undermine the central guarantee of free speech, but it also would fail to serve the
avowed purpose of advancing gender equality. Overly broad definitions of
prohibited harassment or hate speech are at best ineffective in advancing
equality."
' 271
The delicate issue of abusive workplace speech must be addressed in a way
that comports with bedrock principles of free speech. It is equally as important
that the approach reflects the evolving nature of discourse in society and the
workplace, the ways in which a contemporary "hostile work environment" is
generated, and the deleterious effect that such environments have on the progress
and retention of women and other minorities. As Professor Volokh notes,
[i]f one wants to support a new speech restriction without putting at risk the
existing scope of Free Speech Clause protection, one has to provide a limiting
principle, a "discernible [and] defensible boundar[y]," a robust explanation of
why this speech is different: Why this speech deserves to be unprotected, but
why at the same time the Free Speech Clause should continue to protect other
sorts of speech. This, it seems to me, is the challenge facing those who argue
that speech which creates a hostile work environment ought to be
unprotected.
272
This challenge, he concludes, has not been met.
273
But these concerns aside, the constitutionality of Title VII is generally
presumed. Professor Cynthia Estlund notes that "[m]uch of the commentary
echoes the untidy collection of Supreme Court decisions on the First
Amendment in the workplace, which creates a vague and incoherent picture of
permissiveness toward speech restrictions. 274 In order to wield the law as a tool
with which to effectuate true equality in the workplace and to close the gap
between those who have historically been underrepresented in employment and
in public life, and those who have not, Title VII provides a widely accepted basis
269. Volokh, supra note 267.
270. Browne, supra note 267 at 483-84.
271. Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment and Upholding the First
Amendment-A voiding A Collision, 37 VILL. L. REV. 757, 777 (1992).
272. Volokh, supra note 267, at 313.
273. Id.
274. Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 693 (1997).
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for employer liability where speech transforms the workplace into a hostile
environment and palpably alters one's wellbeing or opportunities. Moreover, in
light of what we currently understand about the effects and dynamics of
workplace discourse that is punctuated with abusive speech, speech that lacks the
traditional hallmarks of harassment, but which nonetheless systemically alienates
protected-class members, ought to confer employer liability. Judge Marcus's
point in Reeves, that the harasser need not add "and you are one too," for some
generalized but derisive comments which seem to systemically alienate
protected-class members to become actionable, should become wholly integrated
into the law of Title VII. 275
As Professor David Oppenheimer concludes, it is clear that "[w]hile Title
VII imposes tort liability on employers for sex and race-based on-the-job
harassment, our traditional rules protecting freedom of speech remain intact,"
because
[w]orkplace harassment, like fighting words, is conduct, or language, which
provokes actual injury, in the form of an injurious and verifiably altered work
environment. The wrong is not simply in engaging in the harassment, but in
causing foreseeable injury to another-injury not only subjectively
experienced by the plaintiff, but objectively injurious to a reasonable person.
Unwelcome conduct, whether words or deeds, which constitutes intimidation,
ridicule or insult and is objectively sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of its workplace, making it abusive to employees, may be properly
regarded as outside the protection of the First Amendment .... Women and
minority group members in the workplace are a captive audience.. .[and t]hey
look to their employer to protect them, just as they expect protection from
other unsafe working conditions.
276
Professor Oppenheimer further argues that "the First Amendment is not the
only Constitutional protection at stake when we consider the legitimacy of
governmental regulation of workplace harassment. 27 7  Constitutional
amendments that promote and ensure equality ensure that "minority group
members have a particularly strong entitlement to the state's protection from
harassment., 278 There are
persuasive arguments that racial and sexual harassment, like obscenity and
fighting words, is outside the scope of the First Amendment's protection; that
even if harassment is entitled to protection in some environments, it may be
banned in the workplace; and that countervailing Constitutional interests in
275. Reeves, 594 F.3d at 811.
276. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: A Reply to
Professor Volokh, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 321, 322-23 (1996).
277. Id. at 324.
278. Id.
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protecting minority workers justify regulating harassment on the job. 279
In any event, any perceived expansion of Title VII entailed in a more
holistic, context-based approach to determining Title VII liability should not
raise First Amendment issues beyond those some already perceive with the law
in its current state. As one scholar has noted, "a person who is convinced that
sexually harassing speech could sometimes be constitutionally protected will not
support [a] suggestion of expanded Title VII... liability, and no one who is
convinced that sexually harassing speech is not constitutionally protected should
object to [expansion]... on First Amendment grounds." 280
V. CONCLUSION
To the extent that the culture of the contemporary workplace, specifically
the culture of abusive workplace speech, operates to alienate and impede women
in their quest to advance, what may be done about this phenomenon? And given
that the pervasiveness of this speech engenders and perpetuates "the gap" as
much or more than the failure to accommodate the work/family balance needs of
women, what can be done, inside or outside the legal system, to address it?
Some possible solutions are immediately identified as implausible or
unworkable. For example, one approach might be to say that the pervasive
attitudes and culture are so rife with speech that alienates women that they can
be defused only by infusing new views, attitudes, and approaches into the
highest levels of corporate leadership changing the culture from the inside out
and from the top down. Under this approach, only through the forced integration
of the upper echelons of workplace power and prestige will that which is
considered acceptable and commonplace be transformed into that which is
considered taboo and intolerable.
In 2012, the European Union embarked upon a new effort that could result
in legislation requiring women to occupy up to 60 percent of the seats on
corporate boards. 281 The rationale propelling this European movement is that
industry and companies' self-regulation of gender equality has failed, and
279. Id. at 324-25.
280. Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 697-698 (2012).
One very basic point to make here is that to some extent, the expansion of sexual
harassment law I am suggesting does not really change the terms of the free speech
debate over sexual harassment. If one believes that sexual harassment law
constitutes censorship of constitutionally protected speech in the workplace or
school, one would presumably also believe that restricting it in cyberspace is
unconstitutional. Likewise, if one does not believe that harassing speech is
constitutionally protected, any concerns one might have about expanding Title VII
and Title IX liability to website operators would presumably not be driven by First
Amendment concerns.
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legislation is needed to effectuate change, diversity, and equality of
opportunity. 282 As of 2012, a mere 3.2 percent of European Union companies'
presidents and chairs are women, and women occupy a mere 13.7 percent of the
seats on the boards of large companies. The United States is not much farther
ahead with only 16 percent of its corporate board seats going to women.
283
Whether for this reason or for others, the legislation appears to have received
strong support from European legislators and public citizens alike. A poll
showed that up to 75 percent of respondents in the European Union favored
legislation to balance gender representation on company boards.
284
Moreover, several European countries, including France, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Spain, have legally-compelled quotas or legal
recommendations that forcibly place women in high-powered positions in
companies.285 In Italy, for example, it has been mandated that at least one third
of a company's board be comprised of women by 2015, lest these companies
face fines of up to 1.3 million dollars.2 86 After a three-month consultation
discussing the objectives of the quotas, European Union Commissioner Viviane
Reding has announced that she will propose legislation in the fall of 2012 that
would impose a 40% gender quota on all publicly traded companies in the EU;
the policy continues to be debated as of the writing of this Article.287
However, such an aggressive approach is vulnerable to attack, especially if
proposed in the United States. Rigid quota requirements are considered
anathema to American law, even under affirmative action jurisprudence in this
country. 288 Title VII does not, and should not, guarantee anything more than
equality of opportunity, absent the most extreme and compelling
circumstances. 289 Though there does need to be an extreme shift in workplace
culture, the answer does not lie in such an extreme measure. Such a shift will
likely arise from a greater awareness of what is going on, and such awareness
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harassment was not recognized as something out of the ordinary, let alone
impermissible, prior to the recognition of a discrete cause of action within the
law,29 ° so must gendered abusive speech and workplace cultures of alienation be
recognized by courts as both harmful and unlawful. Just as fear of sexual
harassment liability begat sexual harassment training and the notion of sexual
harassment made its way into popular culture (books, magazines, television
plots-and not just on shows about lawyers) from the 1980s onward, so too
should gendered, abusive speech and hostile workplace environments be
discussed and identified as a barricade today. 291
Courts need to inform their construction of terms like "severe or pervasive"
or "because of sex" with a contemporary understanding of and appreciation for
how language and behavior operate to alter or even transform one's workplace
environment, wellbeing, and opportunities. Courts should stop rejecting the
reasoning and logic embodied in Reeves and begin to acknowledge the real-
world effects of abusive speech in the workplace. Even if these cases do not
always result in liability for the employer, the possibility that these instances
could go to trial may cause employers to think more carefully about allowing
this category of speech to go on within their organizations.
290. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("[T]here may be cases in
which a supervisor makes sexual overtures to workers of both sexes or where the conduct
complained of is equally offensive to male and female workers ... the sexual harassment
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no remedy under Title VII."); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(discussing that a woman's options when faced with sexual intimidation present a "cruel
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